

Gal8Ve  
447

A  
GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY  
V I E W  
OF  
*PROFESSOR KANT's PRINCIPLES*  
CONCERNING  
MAN, THE WORLD AND THE DEITY,  
SUBMITTED TO  
THE CONSIDERATION OF THE LEARNED.

BY  
F. A. NITSCH, *FK*  
LATE LECTURER OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE AND MATHEMATICS IN THE ROYAL FRIDERICIANUM COLLEGE AT KÖNIGSBERG, AND PUPIL OF PROFESSOR KANT.

---

LONDON:  
PRINTED, AND SOLD BY J. DOWNES, NO. 240, STRAND,  
NEAR TEMPLE BAR.

1796.

[Entered at Stationers Hall.]

105





TO  
HIS MOST ESTEEMED  
AND  
MOST VALUABLE FRIENDS,  
DAVID BARKLEY  
AND  
GEORGE HAY Esqrs.  
OF  
KÖNIGSBERG,  
*THIS TREATISE*  
IS  
MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED  
BY  
THE AUTHOR.

THE MOST EMINENT

MOST EMINENT

DAVID PARKER

AND

GEORGE HAY

KNIGHTS

THIS TRACT

THE TRACT

THE AUTHOR

---

A

GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY

VIEW, &c.

---

**T**HERE is nothing which can accelerate the progress of Science more effectually, than a mutual and speedy communication of the various discoveries made in different countries.

It is from a sincere desire to contribute something, if possible, towards promoting this end, that I venture to address the Learned and Philosophers, on the Kantian principles, concerning Man, the World, and the Deity.

A

Immanuel

Immanuel Kant, Royal Professor of Morals and Metaphysics in the University of Königsberg, now about seventy years of age, and still continuing to instruct his numerous auditors with distinguished applause; is universally acknowledged by his enemies, as well as friends, to be the greatest philosophical genius ever produced in Germany. The works which, after twenty years deep study and close application, he has published, between the years 1781 and 1793, and the titles of which are mentioned in the note subjoined\*, are confidently reported to contain the true seeds of a great and beneficial reform in all the departments of theoretical, and in some of practical Philosophy. They are diligently studied by every thinking man in Germany, who would raise himself above the superficial

\* 1. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, or, Criticism of Pure Reason.—Published 1781.

2. *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, or, Introduction to all future Metaphysics that shall deserve the name of a Science.—Published 1783.

3. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, or, Metaphysical Elements of Natural Philosophy.—Published 1787.

4. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, or, Criticism of Practical Reason.—Published 1788.

5. *Kritik*

superficial wisdom of popular maxims, and penetrate deeper than is usual into the more important interests of an intelligent Being.

Although I cannot, at present, undertake to remove the doubts of those writers, who, from want of sufficient knowledge, have endeavoured to detract from the merits of Professor Kant, since this would carry me too far beyond the limits of the present Treatise—yet I am persuaded, that the Learned of this country would do great service to the cause of truth and science, if, instead of leaving any further room for vague and fallacious reports, they were to encourage a correct and speedy translation of his works, and bring the alledged importance of his discoveries to a severe and impartial examination.

5. *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, or, Criticism of Judgment.--Published 1790.

6. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, or, Principles for the Metaphysics of Morals.--Published 1792.

7. *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, or, Religion considered within the Bounds of mere Reason.--Published 1793.

8. *Der einzig mögliche Beweis vom Daseyn Gottes*, or, The only possible Demonstration of the Existence of the Deity.—Published 1770.

This work does not constitute any part of the Kantian system, as it was published ten years before that system was completed.

Whatever the result of such endeavours may be, whether they terminate in a clear and complete refutation of the whole celebrated system, or justify the praises hitherto bestowed on its superior excellence, no one, I trust, will have reason, in either case, to complain, with a certain writer, of having lost his time in a laborious attention, that is unrewarded by the consciousness of useful discovery. For Kant treats of objects which interest the whole human race; his Philosophy is a well-regulated whole of principles, not borrowed from preceding ages. Should these principles stand the test of examination, the present fund of important knowledge will be considerably increased, and should they shrink before the eye of criticism, the detection of their hidden fallacy may serve as a remarkable instance of the necessity of caution against errors of a similar nature, and, perhaps, lead to the discovery of positive and useful truths hitherto unknown,

These considerations have principally induced me, not only to open a free discussion of the Kantian principles by lectures, in which I shall continue, as I have already done, to answer any objections



jections which may be offered, but also to submit them, by a series of successive publications, to the impartial judgment of a philosophic public.

The long space of time which I have employed in studying the Kantian Philosophy, and the favourable opportunity which I have enjoyed, of penetrating into its more difficult arguments, by the immediate assistance of the author, will, I hope, secure me from the reproach of not being sufficiently prepared for what I intend to execute, as well as from the danger of assigning principles to Kant, which he never adopted.

But though, I believe, I am sufficient master of the subject itself, there will be room for indulgence as to the style and mode in which I may deliver my sentiments. And this indulgence, I hope, those will not refuse me, who consider, that the English is not my native language—that to distinguish all the delicacies and all the shades of expression, would have required much more time than I could possibly command—that the essential characteristics of a philosophical style are clearness and precision, rather than form and dress—that all the graces and powers of eloquence have not produced a translation



tion of Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason, although this important work might have been translated ten years ago, and that the pleasures of taste ought to be restrained when they threaten to retard the progress of knowledge. However, the strictest attention to all the remarks which I may be able to obtain concerning my labours, and which, if they are candid and just, I shall always receive with due acknowledgment, will, I hope, soon enable me to satisfy the reader in point of language as well as other particulars.

The present Treatise is chiefly intended to suggest that preliminary knowledge which is indispensably necessary, though not sufficient to the understanding of Professor Kant's principles concerning *Man*, the *World* and the *Deity*, and to enable the reader, as far as is practicable, in an introductory view, previously to judge what he may expect from a more comprehensive study of the Kantian system.

To accomplish these, and similar ends, some writers have attempted to present the public with mere extracts of what seemed to them most remarkable in Kant's writings. But his philosophy  
is

is not known enough to admit of any intelligible extracts, if not accompanied by considerable explanations. It forms one chain of closely connected argument, where each link, from the novelty of its construction, must necessarily perplex the reader, if that immediately preceding be not completely understood.

Being fully convinced that this method of introduction must *unavoidably* fail of success, and that a translation of Kant's works, however desirable, ought, for many reasons, not to appear without some proper introduction, I shall attempt in consequence of some hints contained in Professor Reinhold's excellent Theory of Human Representations, to pursue a different road, and to lay before the reader in this Treatise as a preliminary consideration, first, THAT SERIES OF PHILOSOPHIC OPINIONS WHICH HAS GIVEN OCCASION TO THOSE KANTIAN PRINCIPLES, of which I shall offer an extract. And this series of opinions will, I think, become an object worthy of particular attention. For although they may already be known from the history of Philosophy, yet I am certain, they are not considered in that light in which Kant has considered

considered them, and in which they ought to be considered, in order that his improvements and discoveries may be properly understood and duly estimated. To this historical sketch of opinions I shall add, as a second necessary object of previous consideration, SOME REMARKS ON THAT METHOD OF PHILOSOPHISING WHICH PROFESSOR KANT HAS USED IN HIS ENQUIRIES. And these remarks will, I flatter myself, contribute to throw a light on the spirit of his Philosophy. I shall, besides, clearly and impartially describe, as far as is practicable, that INFLUENCE WHICH HIS PHILOSOPHY IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON SCIENCE IN GENERAL, AND ON RELIGION AND MORALS IN PARTICULAR. By thus contrasting the Kantean System with those of other Philosophers, I think I shall enable the reader to form a good previous opinion of what he may reasonably expect from the study of Kant's works, and put him in possession of such preliminary knowledge as will prove useful to him whenever a translation of these works shall appear.

Conformably to this plan, I shall begin with examining that series of philosophic opinions which has given occasion to Kant's principles. But that  
these

these opinions may be the more attentively *considered*, I shall first offer a short description of those objects to which they refer.

These opinions do not refer to the objects investigated by Natural Philosophy, but to those only which the study of that excellent Science incessantly stimulates us to examine, and of which it can never of itself give any explicit information.

To prevent misunderstanding, I must state, that by Natural Philosophy I mean that Science, which enquires into the various properties and relations of the visible or sensible Phenomena in Nature, and which excludes from the compass of its contemplations all those things, properties, and relations whose existence is not attested by the incontrovertible evidence of the senses.

Now, there are many objects of which the senses are totally ignorant, and of which Natural Philosophy cannot consequently treat; but which, nevertheless, interest all mankind, and perpetually obtrude themselves upon the attention of those who survey the nature of the world with understanding.

These remarkable objects, which have their proper place in Metaphysics only, I shall particularise

in the following manner ; not, however, in order to say something unknown, but to pave myself a more easy passage from what is known, to *something* which may perhaps not be known \*.

I. Natural Philosophy, as has been mentioned already, unfolds the various properties discoverable in the natural Phenomena by our senses, and by doing this with a rigorous accuracy it prepares us to make a distinction between things and the mere properties of things. Thus it asserts, that a thing is coloured, solid, heavy, figured, &c. and that neither colour, nor solidity, nor weight, nor figure, taken singly or collectively, can make the thing. But as it informs us only of these and other properties, it raises our curiosity, to enquire what the things can be which are said to have these or other properties. This question, however, remains unanswered, and although it is extremely metaphysical, yet it has induced many Philosophers of great repute to divest, in their thoughts, every existing

\* I beg leave to remark, that if any thing generally known to the scholar should have been introduced in some other part of this Treatise, it has been done with a view to render it useful also to the beginner in that branch of Philosophy, of which I shall have occasion to treat.

object in nature, of those properties which we usually discover in them by our senses, and to maintain concerning the remaining invisible or insensible beings several opposite opinions, which it is totally impossible to reconcile. Without approving or disapproving of such a separation, I have only to remark at present, that all the existing things in the world, when thus stripped of their sensible properties, are usually called substances, and that substances, in this sense of the word, have been investigated by Professor Kant with the greatest attention, not in order to discover their internal nature, which would have been impossible, but to bring to a final determination those contradictory opinions entertained with regard to them by Philosophers, which, although they may seem trifling at first sight, yet have a decided and fatal influence on the use of our reason in matters of Science, Morals, and Religion.

II. Natural Philosophy not only investigates the properties of the phenomena which surround us, but it also traces them back to their respective causes. It proves with incontrovertible evidence, that all nature consists of one uninterrupted and



complex chain of causes and effects, and puts us in mind, that as a chain must have a first link, so the causes in nature must depend upon a first cause. This Science goes still farther, and teaches mankind in very plain and convincing language, that the first cause is an intelligent, mighty, omnipresent, wise, and beneficent Being. But as this very same science brings forward equally strong arguments to prove that the properties of the first cause are different from those of the things produced by it, and this not only in degree, but also in kind, philosophers have been at much variance concerning that species of properties peculiarly belonging to the first cause; and as they were taught by the same science to distinguish between things and mere properties of things, they attempted, in consequence of this, to free their idea of the first cause from all those appendages, as they express themselves, borrowed from the perceivable nature of man or the world; but finding this idea to vanish in the same proportion as they deprived it of those borrowed properties, they began to disagree concerning what they ought precisely to think by the term *first cause*, and much more



more concerning what demonstrations they should offer in support of its existence.

In order to settle this division of sentiment, which originally sprung up from an accurate study of Natural Philosophy, and which must inevitably prove highly injurious to the cause of truth and virtue, Professor Kant has composed a section in his Criticism of Pure Reason, which in the opinion of the acutest German Philosophers, cannot fail of deciding those dissensions completely and for ever.

III. Natural Philosophy not only investigates the properties and causes of things, but it also classes the whole visible world into various kingdoms and districts of living and inanimate objects, penetrates through that multiplicity of connections, in which they stand with men as well as themselves, and informs us that all the innumerable objects in the universe are but parts of a grand and beautiful whole. But after it has thus excited the natural curiosity of man to ask whether this whole is bounded or infinite, it does not return any satisfactory answer to this question.

The bounds of the universe in time and space, together with the limits prescribed to the divisibility

lity of matter, are unquestionably objects not perceivable by the senses ; it is, therefore, no wonder that Natural Philosophy excludes them from the circle of its enquiries. It might indeed seem that mankind would lose nothing by being ignorant of the bounds of the universe. But such ignorance necessarily implies a want of other knowledge highly unfavourable to the true interests of mankind. For Professor Kant, who treats of this subject at large in his Criticism of Pure Reason, has clearly demonstrated that doubts and dissensions concerning the bounds of the universe are a sure sign that the bounds of human knowledge are not completely fixed. But wherever the limits of human knowledge are not fully ascertained, there will be no certain means to stop the progress of enthusiasm, superstition, and scepticism, than which there can be no greater enemies to the true interests of mankind.

IV. Man, as a part of the visible world, falls likewise under the consideration of Natural Philosophy. This remarkable phenomenon has been the object of examination for many thousand years, and has, among many other wonderful properties, discovered

discovered a faculty of perceiving things by means of organical senses. The enquirers into nature observed indeed, very early, that the perceiving faculty, or rather the percipient in man, cannot be known by means of the natural eye, touch, &c. and that therefore, it cannot have the properties of extension, solidity, &c. which are constantly attached to the objects of the eye and touch; for otherwise it would, in their opinion, be visible or tangible, which it is not. But although Natural Philosophy most irresistibly leads us to make this remarkable distinction between the percipient and the objects of the external senses, yet it leaves us unsatisfied, when we ask, wherein that distinction precisely consists, whether the one be simple and the others composed, the first a spirit and the last corporeal; or whether all the existences in the universe, according to their true nature, are merely material or merely spiritual, or both at the same time.

It has been attempted to draw the attention of man from SUCH ABSTRUSE SPECULATIONS, as they are called, into the fertile field of Practical Philosophy; but these attempts have always miscarried. And indeed, what can be more natural than that  
man,

man, who feels a curiosity to know the nature of the surrounding objects, should take an equal interest in knowing his own perceiving self.

V. Natural Philosophy asserts, that from the same causes under similar circumstances, the same effects may be expected. It proves with great force of argument, that this rule holds good within the whole circle of corporeal phenomena; that is to say, as far as they are known. But when we consider man, and endeavour to account for the various motions and actions observable in him, we believe this rule must be liable to some exception. For every man's own experience will evince, that from the same causes and under similar circumstances, the same effects are not always produced upon human volitions; that fire and sword, for instance, may, at one time, be the cause of flight and submission, and at another, of the strongest resolution to resist, even at the hazard of life itself. This seems to demonstrate the existence of a certain power in man, which may act uninfluenced by other powers, and obey no other laws than those of its own constitution. But whether man has really a power of this description

scription or not, Natural Philosophy, although it directs our attention to this subject very frequently, has not been able to decide, that is, not in an universally evident manner. For the Necessitarians who, as is generally known, make a considerable party in the philosophic world, publicly protest against the arguments that have been brought forward in favour of such a power, and boldly affirm that they are not conclusive.

Without declaring myself for or against any of these parties, it is sufficient at present, to notice that the human will, be it free or not, is an object imperceptible by the senses, and therefore inaccessible to the investigations of Natural Philosophy, provided we keep to that definition which was given of this Science by the great Bacon.

Profeſſor Kant has devoted a most remarkable chapter in his Criticism of Pure Reason, to the subject of Human Volition, where he proposes a method of settling the dissensions regarding this difficult question, which is equally new and deserving of attention.

I have now clearly pointed out all the objects of those philosophic opinions which roused the

genius of Kant to build his celebrated system concerning Man, the World, and the Deity. These objects were the nature of the substances of which the world is composed, the bounds of the universe, the first cause of all that exists, the nature of the percipient principle, or the soul in man, and the free agency of human volition. Of these objects I have remarked that they are imperceptible by the senses, and that as such, they cannot belong to the field of Natural Philosophy. As Metaphysics form that Science which treats of existences not perceivable by the senses, those objects will most naturally have their places in this science ; and as every man from the highest to the lowest in capacity, has formed for himself some notions of the first cause, the soul, the human will, &c. it follows, that every man is, in some degree, a Metaphysician, although it cannot be inferred from this circumstance, that every man's metaphysics will agree with those of others, or be equally correct.

It is now proper to lay before the reader that variety of philosophical opinions which predominate at this day, concerning the objects I have particularised,



ticularised, and this I shall endeavour to do briefly in the following manner :

## OPINIONS.

### I. CONCERNING THE SUBSTANCES OF THE WORLD.

- (a) All existing substances are either simple, or composed of the simple.
- (b) There is no where in the universe any substance existing which is simple or composed of simple parts, but all that really exists is composed in the strictest sense of the word.

### II. CONCERNING THE BOUNDS OF THE UNIVERSE IN TIME AND SPACE.

- (a) The world has a beginning in time, and bounds in space.
- (b) The world has neither a beginning in time, nor bounds in space.

III. CONCERNING THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THAT  
EXISTS.

- (a) There is an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cause.
- (b) There is no absolutely necessary Being existing, either within or without the world.

IV. CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE PERCIPIENT, OR THE SOUL IN MAN.

- (a) The soul or the percipient is composed, and is material.
- (b) The soul or the percipient is not composed, is not matter, but it is simple and spiritual.

V. CONCERNING THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN VOLITIONS.

- (a) The phenomena in nature cannot be all accounted for from the operations of mechanical

chanical causes, and it is indispensably necessary to suppose a kind of causes operating freely and independently of foreign impulse.

- (b) There is no freedom of operation in any of the causes found in the universe, but all events happen according to a determined and invariable necessity.

Here we have five plain questions, viz. "Are the substances simple or not?" "Has the world a beginning in time or not?" "Has it bounds in space or not?" "Is an absolutely necessary first cause existing or not?" "Is the human will free or not?" Concerning each of these questions we have found two opposite opinions. These opposite opinions have been defended by philosophers of the first rank for more than seventeen hundred years; but none of them has become universally evident, nor has any one of them been completely refuted.

The

The learned and philosophical reader will require no proof of what I have just asserted. He already knows, from the writings yearly published and republished on the subjects of the human will, the nature of the soul, the substances of the world, and the bounds of the universe, that the public opinion really is divided on these subjects, as I have described it to be.

As to the opposite opinions regarding the first cause, it may be imagined that they suppose the existence of Atheists. But this they are not intended to suppose; I think too favourably of the understandings of men, to be easily persuaded, that any intelligent being can, with an attentive eye, contemplate the wonderful structure of the immense universe, and yet seriously believe in his heart there is no God. Those opposite opinions do not originate in Atheism, but in an inconsiderate, though well meant zeal to demonstrate the existence of the Deity; which zeal discovers itself even in the language of those who protest against all demonstration in this particular. The existence of the Deity, strictly speaking, is not demonstrable. And as every attempt to demonstrate what is not demonstrable,

monstrable, must necessarily first excite doubts, and then opposite opinions and demonstrations, so the repeated attempts to demonstrate the existence of the Deity have really introduced into the world many doubts, opposite opinions, and demonstrations, concerning this important object, which, although they cannot succeed in reducing sound sense to complete Atheism, for this would be impossible, may serve, however, to force the Dogmatists to correct their demonstrations, and to reject those means which are calculated to defeat their own purposes.

Supposing it therefore as a fact known to every Scholar and Philosopher, that such difference of opinion, as above stated, does yet really prevail, and trusting the reader will agree with me, that a constant repugnance in sentiment respecting objects of great importance to mankind, must necessarily have a tendency, if not to erect the black standard of Atheism, yet to enlarge the empire of Scepticism, and to generate a kind of distrust in the decisions of reason, I shall proceed to exhibit those measures which Professor Kant thought proper to adopt in order to remove that evil.

This

This Philosopher soon observed, that the methods which till then had been used to settle those dissensions were the very causes of their having continued through so many centuries, and of their present continuance. For it had either been customary to ridicule every man who engaged in controversies of this nature, and to brand his doubts with the name of metaphysical subtleties, or to defend one side of the question and demonstrate the falsehood of the opposite side. But it had not been perceived that neither of these methods were adapted to the end proposed. For, in the first place, every man is born a Metaphysician. He cannot help reasoning in some serious moments on the nature of his own perceiving self, the nature of the things around him, and that Being which has called him and the world into existence. Now, in the prevailing fluctuation of opposite opinions upon these subjects, if any man should happen to involve himself in doubts, by endeavouring to stop the current of ambiguity, surely this evil can be remedied only by the superior force of argument, not by wit or ridicule, and much less by indecent contempt. In the second place,



place, I ask if it has ever been clear, that either of the two contending parties must be right and the opposite wrong? Can it not happen that both parties may be totally wrong in some respects, and perfectly right in others, and that, therefore, the one of them observing the weak sides of their opponents, cannot for that reason, come over to their opinion, although the falsehood that lies concealed in their own arguments, and is well observed by the contrary party, cannot reasonably prevail upon that contrary party to exchange their opinions for opposite ones equally erroneous? Now, if this should be the case with the controversies concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, the freedom of human volition, &c. it is evident that the method of deciding them by defending one side of the question, and refuting its opposite, although proper in many cases, must be highly improper in the present.

Profeffor Kant not only suspected that this might be the case with regard to the controversies alluded to, and the methods of deciding them, but really discovered that his suspicion was but too well founded, and that the contending parties,

D

instead

instead of contriving arguments for and against the materiality or immateriality of the soul, the necessity or freedom of human volition, &c. ought to have laid aside all argumentation until they had agreed about truths of a very different nature. For in examining the precise state of this controversy, he was surprised to find the conceptions formed of the soul, the human will, the substances, &c. were such as not only to admit of two opposite opinions, but also, what might seem incredible, to furnish arguments in favour of both, which are equally strong and convincing. This remarkable circumstance left no longer any doubt upon his mind, but that in those notions, although they are far from being merely fictitious, *yet* some contradictory ingredients must lie at the bottom, which are unobserved by the contending parties, and which, when drawn to light, would lay open the mistake, and blend their clashing conceptions in one solid mass of genuine truth.

Those Sections of the Criticism of Pure Reason, wherein this extraordinary *conflict of thought* has been pursued to its minutest elements, belong to the most instructive parts of that work. They are  
highly

highly beneficial to mankind, and will doubtless give a lasting peace to the regions of Speculative Philosophy. As the present Treatise is merely introductory, it performs its duty, when it marks the places of investigation, points out the method, and refers the reader to those works, where further information may be obtained.

Accordingly, without attempting to demonstrate any of Professor Kant's opinions, it is sufficient for me to prove, by *an instance*, the possibility of forming such conceptions of things, as shall not only occasion two contradictory opinions, but also suggest arguments for them, that *shall* be equally strong and convincing. Let the reader figure to his mind a square circle, and he will have an object before him, concerning which he may demonstrate with equal force of argument two contradictory assertions, viz. that a square circle is, at the same time, round and not round. But this repugnance could never occur, if the subject of these assertions, or the conception of a square circle, did not involve repugnant parts. The same case holds good, according to the results of the Criticism of Pure Reason, with regard to the conceptions of substances,

the Soul, the freedom of human Volition, the Deity, and the *contradictory demonstrations* built upon them. They contain, like the conceptions and the opinions of a square circle, some indubitable truth found by analysis, but include, at the same time, some mixture of contradiction.

Professor Kant, not satisfied with having made this discovery, most earnestly endeavoured then to find wherein the contradiction concealed in those remarkable conceptions consisted, and how it could be laid open in the most unequivocal manner. He was well aware, that an analysis would indeed shew their component parts; but the question being what they ought to contain, and not what they do, he soon perceived, that besides the analytical, another method must necessarily be pursued. He saw, that, to correct our notions of things, we must not only resolve them into their elementary parts, but also compare them with those objects which they represent. But here a difficulty arose, which seemed insurmountable. For those objects to which the conceptions in question refer, are, the Soul, the Will of Man, the Deity, &c. which, as has been shewn, are altogether imperceptible to the senses.

senses. How then should we compare our conceptions with things that are imperceptible?—The question, in the present case, naturally is, “Can any man have notions of real existencies which are imperceptible?” Before we have satisfactorily answered this question, all philosophising on these imperceptible objects must necessarily be extremely unsafe. Professor Kant, observing that mankind is more concerned to acquire knowledge, than mere conceptions of things, changed the above question in the following manner: “Is it possible for the human intellect to know any thing of imperceptible objects;” and to express this in a manner still more comprehensive, he proposed to himself the following problem:

“*What* can be known by man in general, or  
 “ what is the nature and extent of human  
 “ knowledge in general?”

To this question he found, indeed, a great many direct and indirect answers given in the various essays published on the human mind, but not one among them which was completely satisfactory. For in spite of all the elegance, in point of method and diction, displayed on this subject, it appears  
 that

that nothing decisive has been brought out. For one part of the philosophic world professes to know only material objects, another not only material but also spiritual objects, and a third pretends to know nothing at all, that is to say, with indubitable certainty.

Professor Kant, desirous to establish, as already mentioned, a criterion of what is knowable in general, soon perceived that it would be vain to look for it in the variety of corporeal and spiritual objects, pretended to be already known; for this might, perhaps, give us a criterion of what has been known, but not, as is here requisite, of what is knowable in general. He, therefore, concluded, that the materials for such a criterion must lie within, and not without, man, that they must reside in a certain capacity, which enables him to know things.

Being convinced that reason must either in part or wholly constitute the capacity of knowledge, he thought it indispensably necessary to enquire into the nature of this faculty.

And this enquiry seemed necessary from more than one consideration. For there is perhaps no age, in which reason has been more adored, or  
more



more condemned, than the present. By some it is exalted as the Awful Judge, before whose tribunal alone the most weighty concerns of mankind can and ought to be decided ; by others it is represented as a being of contracted views, and which, without the assistance of Divine illumination, would blindly hurry man into everlasting perdition.

But what then is the peculiar nature of this mighty or feeble faculty ? To this we find the following answers :—It is a faculty which every body knows, without explanation ; it may be better felt than explained, and definitions may here perplex, but they cannot instruct. It is a faculty which distinguishes man from the brutes. It is that in man, which enables him to form designs, and to discover the most proper means. It is a power, which elevates the views of man beyond the confines of this globe, conducts him from one system of worlds to another, and leads him to the first of all beings. It is a power which, by the assistance of organization, enables man to comprehend what passes within and without him.

All these various opinions comprehended in one notion, form the most extensive, and therefore the most

most indefinite sense, in which the term, reason, has hitherto been used. There is, however, a meaning in this term, which is a little more confined, and, according to which, it implies those mental faculties that are opposed to sense, and which discover themselves in judgments and reasonings. The term reason, taken in a more confined sense, will therefore comprehend, besides what is properly called reason, also the judging faculty or the understanding, and exclude the faculty of sense. The term reason, considered in the most confined and definite sense it has ever been received, not only excludes the faculty of sense, but also that of judgment or understanding, and implies merely the faculty of reasoning or concluding, distinctly considered from all other faculties of the mind.

When, therefore, reason forms designs, or discovers means, when it traces the systems of immense worlds, where the eye sees only small luminous spots, when it penetrates into the secrets of invisible regions, and climbs up to the first of all beings, it must do this by means of conclusions.— This assertion must be granted, provided reason shall remain an active faculty. For, according to all logical disquisitions, there are only three different kinds

kinds of operations, by which the mind knows things, viz. simple apprehension, judgment, and conclusion. As the first can belong to sense only, the second to the understanding only, there remains no other than the last, or the conclusion for reason ; and, therefore, whatever this faculty may know, it must necessarily acquire that knowledge by the act of concluding.

In order to fix the bounds of what can be known in general, Professor Kant thought it indispensably requisite to enquire, what may be known by this faculty of concluding.

The works hitherto written on the various powers of the mind seemed to promise no inconsiderable assistance in this attempt, and, indeed, the unanimity with which they had defined what we are to understand by a conclusion, induced Kant to believe, that they would be as unanimous in defining what we are to understand by reason. For, according to what has been already said, when the faculty of concluding is rightly and universally understood, the faculty of reasoning cannot be any longer misconceived, and when the nature of reason is known, the bounds of human knowledge at-

E

tainable

tainable by reason cannot of course be mistaken. But in these expectations he found himself very much disappointed.

A conclusion is indeed defined to be the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by comparing them to a third ; but grant this definition to be correct, and it will follow, that reason, so far from knowing any thing, can of itself know nothing. For how can a mere concluding faculty, as it has been just described, give knowledge, when it supposes ideas, of which knowledge is composed, as necessary to the exercise of its functions.

If then the concluding act of reason cannot make us know any thing, but by means of ideas, the question arises : Whence reason acquires the ideas of which it forms its conclusions ?—When these ideas refer to objects which strike the senses, the answer will be easy, and we may say ; From experience ; but when they refer to objects not perceivable by the senses, such as the soul, the first cause, &c. whence does reason derive these ideas ?

From

From revelation, say some philosophers, especially those who think human reason too weak to acquire true and sufficient knowledge of such objects by its own natural powers. These good men, say other philosophers, prove the weakness of human reason by their example, rather than by their argument. In support of this assertion, they argue, that every revelation of the Deity, the soul, or other objects beyond the reach of the senses, which stands up in opposition to sound reason, ought to be rejected as spurious. If this be rational, it follows, say they, that ideas of the soul, the Deity, &c. must be prior in the mind, and not posterior to revelation. For who, continue these men, can reasonably adopt or reject any ideas offered of those important objects, without having examined them, and how can they be examined, without being compared with ideas already in the mind; and who, therefore, can pretend to have received just and correct ideas of the Deity, the soul, &c. from revelation, when the correctness and justness of the ideas that are contained in any revelation, can only be ascertained and acknowledged by comparing them to ideas which must

exist previously in the mind, in order to render such comparison and examination possible.

Although the philosophers who are of the last-mentioned opinion, persuade themselves that they have approached much nearer to truth, in not deriving the ideas of insensible objects from revelation; yet they widely differ as to the source from which they are derivable, and reciprocally refute one another in the following manner :

As these ideas, say they, cannot originally derive from revelation, they must be produced, or acquired by reason in a more natural manner. But as reason is merely a faculty of concluding, it can as such produce no ideas at all ; it must, therefore receive them. Now there are only two possible ways of receiving them ; either the mind receives them at its creation, and then they are innate, or it receives them from the knowledge of external objects, wherein they lie concealed, and from which they are brought into light by abstraction or derivation. In the last case, they are not innate, but acquired.

Those philosophers who assume innate ideas, are exposed to the following objections : He that assumes

innate



innate ideas, must allow a distinction between these ideas and the objects to which they refer; otherwise he confounds ideas with things, and things with ideas. He must further allow the necessity of proving, that those ideas which he calls innate do really refer to existencies distinct from them; for, otherwise, he cannot be certain, that they are altogether any thing more than mere ideas or entities of the mind. But how can he prove this? To say, I have ideas of this or that description, and therefore these ideas must refer to real existencies, is proving nothing. And what other argument remains? Comparison is impracticable; for the objects to be compared lie beyond the limits of the senses. If, therefore, it is not yet decided whether the supposed innate ideas are *real* ideas or not, it cannot be certain that they are innate.

And indeed a very respectable body of Philosophers have been convinced by these and other reasons, that the hypothesis of Plato and Leibnitz concerning innate ideas is not tenable. They have accordingly resolved to try a different method of enquiry, and to derive, with Aristotle and Locke, the ideas of immaterial objects from experience.

rience. The principle upon which they proceed, is, that every idea of immaterial as well as material objects has originally entered the mind through the channel of the senses, except the ideas referring to the operations of the mental faculties, which are acquired by the act of reflection. Reason, in their opinion, must accordingly have a power to unfold the immaterial, which exists without the mind, from the material, which works upon the senses. The mode in which reason performs this unfolding operation, they express by the terms Abstraction, Modification, Derivation. The only misfortune is, that these Philosophers do not, and cannot, agree, at this day, to which of these three modes of unfolding they should give the preference. And, indeed, they will never agree concerning this circumstance. For what material object can be modified into a Deity? Can the Deity or the soul form any perceivable parts of any body, and so admit of being abstracted or derived from it? Nevertheless they believe, that as our ideas of immaterial objects cannot be furnished by revelation, nor considered as innate, they must, therefore, be acquired by some mode of abstraction

straction or other, although it is not yet agreed as to the way in which this is practicable.

Other Philosophers finding three opposite opinions, concerning one question which have been alternately destroyed and revived again for many centuries, are inclined equally to doubt of them all, and either believe that nothing decisive can ever brought out on these points in debate, or that these dissentions may, or will in time, be brought to a final determination.

Of the last opinion was Professor Kant. He indeed doubted of the correctness of those opinions entertained by the adherents of Leibnitz and Locke, and clearly saw, that as long as it is not decided, whence reason derives the ideas of immaterial objects necessary to its bold conclusions on immaterial existencies, so long it must be absolutely uncertain what we are precisely to understand by reason, and much more so, what kind of knowledge we may safely expect from this faculty; but being once determined to discover, if possible, some mode of demonstrating the bounds of human knowledge, or human ignorance, and believing that the understanding might perhaps contain  
some

some data from which reason might derive the ideas of immaterial objects, he attempted to investigate the nature of this faculty.

The first question to be answered in order to ensure success, naturally was : What is meant by the term Understanding ? To this he found the following and similar answers : It is a faculty merely arising from speech. It is a judging faculty. What is judgment ? It is an operation of the mind so familiar to every man who has understanding, and its name is so common and so well understood, that it needs no definition. The most exact account which Professor Kant could obtain of the understanding, was, that this faculty enables a man to perceive the agreement and disagreement of two ideas immediately, in distinction from reason which makes him perceive the same agreement and disagreement of ideas, only mediately, that is to say, by means of comparing them to a third.

According to this account of things, it was clear at once, that the understanding being a faculty of perceiving only the agreement or disagreement of ideas, or, what is the same, of perceiving their common nature and specific differences must as such necessarily

necessarily suppose ideas itself, and receive them from some other quarter, before it can exercise its functions upon them. And here a question arises similar to that respecting reason : Whence does the understanding receive the ideas referring to immaterial objects ?

If the mind is active with regard to the acquisition of knowledge ; if knowledge involves ideas of real existencies ; if, farther, the activity of the mind must necessarily consist in concluding, judging, and apprehending simply, it necessarily follows, that, as the ideas of immaterial objects cannot be derived from any concluding or judging operation, they must either originate in simple apprehension, or in the dreaming faculty of the imagination. In the last case, it would be easy to fix the bounds of human knowledge, because it would be manifest, that man can have knowledge of material objects only.

Professor Kant, accordingly, investigated the nature of simple apprehension. He found, that to apprehend things simply, means, in the present case, as much as to contemplate them immediately, and without the aid of deduction. He farther ob-

F

served,

served, that to contemplate things immediately, requires man to have a sensitive faculty; because without such a faculty, man could not have objects for his contemplation, any more than he could have objects for sight, without a faculty of seeing. This, however, is pretty generally granted, and it would be well, if Philosophers did as generally agree concerning what we are precisely to understand by the faculty of sense.

Professor Kant finding, that among the essential conditions, under which simple apprehension is possible, the sensitive faculty must be numbered, and that, in consequence, whatever contradicts the nature of sense, cannot be contemplated by any effort of simple apprehension, believed it to be indispensably requisite to penetrate deeply into the constitution of the sensitive faculty, and to collect all possible information on this subject.

He took it for granted, that nothing was so well known, and so generally understood, as the sensitive faculty; because he found almost every Philosopher supposed it to be known, and considered it as deserving only a superficial explication, and as requiring the mere mention of its name to make it  
directly



directly understood ; but when he came to contrast their respective opinions on this subject more accurately, he was surprised to find, that within the whole compass of Speculative Philosophy, there was not one object less known and less understood than the nature of the sensitive faculty \*.

I. The Materialists have laid it down as the fundamental principle of their Philosophic System, that all existencies in the world are either mere bodies, or properties of bodies, or relations between bodies. Agreeably to this principle, they explain the sensitive faculty to be a mere property of organization, and to consist chiefly in the irritability of the nerves. As in this manner corporeal objects only can be known to man, sense with them is the source of all true and substantial knowledge. And as reason and the understanding can have no other employment left than that of comparing and arranging the materials furnished by sense, these fa-

\* As I am now proceeding to contrast more particularly the opinions of the philosophical parties into which the public is divided, I must observe, that these parties have done much good to the cause of truth, and that their division in sentiment cannot reflect any discredit upon their understandings ; for this division originates in certain delusions of reason, that are as natural and unavoidable as those of the eye with regard to the motion of the sun, and the colour of bodies.

culties are also mere modifications of the organization.

It is chiefly upon the foundation of Materialism, as here delineated, that it has been attempted by many celebrated Philosophers to consider thought as a mere property of the nervous system, to take the capacity of reciprocal resistance in inert, solid, and incompressible bodies, for a mechanical species of perception, to account for all our sensations, ideas, and mental operations, from vibrations, vibratiuncles, or miniature vibrations of the medullary substance of the nerves and brain, to go even so far as to suppose our ideas of sight to consist of a kind of matter resembling the Bononian stone, or some kind of phosphorus, of which the mind could fabricate some hundreds in a day, &c. and to believe that science will then alone advance with rapid strides, when future generations shall put all kinds of evidences and enquiries into mathematical forms, and, as it were, reduce Aristotle's ten categories, and *Isop* Wilkins's forty summa genera to the head of quantity alone, so as to make Mathematics and Logic, Natural History and Civil History, and

and Philosophy of all other kinds, coincide omni ex parte.

II. The Idealists entertain opinions diametrically opposite to those adopted by the Materialists. They assert, that there is no world existing without the mind, and that therefore there is no occasion for assuming any kind of sensitive faculty to inform us of bodies, nerves, miniature vibrations, phosphorus and Bononian stones, all these things existing no where else than in our own imagination, where they are fabricated and converted into objects that shall have an external existence.

In our enlightened times it would be ridiculous to avow opinions of this description. It seems even incredible, that any Idealist in any age could forget himself so far as to run *his head against a post*, merely because he found in his system, that no external world does exist, and that therefore nothing could be without to hurt him. Yet, nevertheless, I am bold enough to affirm, without being an advocate for Idealism, that this sect, when argument, and not custom or habit, shall decide, must necessarily gain additional strength, in the same proportion as Materialism attains higher degrees of perfection,

fection, and that it may therefore serve as a powerful mean, if not to refute the arguments of this sect, at least to make them extremely suspicious ; as may be seen from the following reasonings :

The Materialists conclude, from their ideas of an external world, that therefore such a world must exist ; but from the existence of an idea to the existence of its object, there is no manner of conclusion. They farther maintain, that the existence of an external world is certain to demonstration, because we have intuitive knowledge of it, and because intuitive knowledge wants no demonstration, it being self-evident. But this intuitive knowledge, say the Idealists, reports of the external things that they are coloured, which they evidently are not—that they are solid, which they are not, solidity implying a set of sensations existing within our touch, and not without it—that they are extended and figured, which they are not, the notions of extension and figure being merely relative, that is, no notions of the things at all. Now, continue they, solidity, figure, and colour, are considered by the Materialists as necessary to the very existence of external things, so that when  
these

these properties, especially extension, are taken away, the things immediately vanish. But it has been just mentioned, that these properties can exist no where else than in the ideas of the mind; hence it follows, that the thing, whose very existence depends on those properties, must likewise exist no where else but in the ideas of the mind. When, therefore, that intuitive knowledge of external things, adduced by the Materialists, as a demonstration of their existence, can, in fact, inform us of things only that exist in the mind, how *then* can the adherents of this sect infer, from such knowledge, the existence of a whole external world, of which they cannot instance a single property, and, moreover, assume a sensitive faculty, to make us acquainted with things of which we can have no knowledge at all.

It is, therefore, certain, that there being no external world, no sensitive faculty can exist, that, consequently, the world of ideas is the only world of realities, and that the endeavours of the Materialists, to convert the ideas and operations of our minds into external bodies and mechanical motions, will and can never succeed.

How-

However mistaken the Idealists may be in their notions of things, one of their arguments, which is most dangerous to Materialism, will, I think, bear out against all attacks that may be made upon it, and this is, that all our ideas of things are merely relative.

III. The Spiritualists, who agree with the last-mentioned sect, in believing that the true nature of things is known to the intellect only, differ from them as to what they should understand by the sensitive faculty. And it is in this particular, that they cannot agree even among themselves.

Those who follow Leibnitz, the greatest of all Spiritualists, naturally assume it as a fundamental principle of their system, that the world is a compound of simple substances, that our opinion of things being extended and figured, is the result of confused ideas, and that the sensitive faculty, which furnishes these ideas, so far from being the true source of real knowledge, is rather a hindrance to the intellect, which alone has the power to contemplate things as they are, and to procure substantial knowledge of the world.

As



As to the place where this faculty resides, the diffentions among these Philosophers are still greater.

Some of them think, that it must have its seat in the body, or the organization of the body, and consider it as a faculty adapted to receive impressions, and to communicate them to the incorporeal soul, which as such cannot be properly said to admit of impressions, and, therefore, of having in itself a sensitive faculty.

Others assert, that it must be in the soul, in order to receive impressions made on the organization. These, indeed, allow it to be a property of the soul itself, but they consider it as a mere accidental property, which vanishes away as soon as the union between the body and soul is resolved.

And still others are of opinion, that it must be at once in the soul and body. These men take it for a faculty of being affected by external things, through the medium of organization; and the organization, they think, instead of enlarging the views of the mind, rather tends to confine them within the circle of sensible objects.

IV. The Eclecticks who saw, that the absurd opinions of the Alexandrine and other schools could not be reformed, unless implicit belief were discarded and free enquiry set on foot, have, in order to carry on the work of truth with better success, firmly resolved not to pay implicit deference to any philosophic sect or leader, and to construct systems of opinions which shall be properly and peculiarly their own; but as to the subject of our present enquiry, however they may disallow the authority of great names, yet they must necessarily either assume a sensitive faculty in man or not. In the last case they will be Idealists, although they protest against this sect; and in the first, they must either consider the sensitive faculty as the only source of genuine knowledge, and confirm Materialism, or grant, that besides this faculty, the powers of reason and intellect contain other sources of genuine and different knowledge. In this case, they must be Spiritualists, and place the sensitive faculty either in the organizations alone, or in the soul alone, or in both together, and thus give additional currency to the controverted

verted opinions of those very sects which they pretend to reform.

V. The Sceptics, especially those of them who proceed upon principles, perceiving so many irregular and discordant opinions defended concerning the sensitive faculty, thus accost the defenders :

You are constructing systems of opinion. Are you then agreed wherein truth may consist ? Have you already discovered a criterion by which you may judge whether or not your ideas of things agree with the things which they represent. No, you have not. And what is more, you never will discover such a criterion ; for your ideas of things are not the things themselves, but merely copies of them. Can you, then, lay aside these ideas for a few moments and compare the copy with the original ? No, you cannot. For whatever you view, you must necessarily view it through the medium of your ideas. All comparison therefore is impossible. A criterion of truth is impossible, and all your controversies, together with all your opinions concerning the sensitive faculty and other uncertain points, will never convince us, nor interrupt by

vain diffentions, the superior tranquillity of our minds.\*

From this comparative view of the various opinions hitherto maintained concerning the faculties of sense, understanding, and reason, it will, I hope, clearly appear; first, that Philosophers have not yet succeeded in determining accurately and in an universally evident manner, what we are to understand by the faculty of sense, and that it is still uncertain whether or not this faculty can furnish such materials as can admit of being modified into ideas of immaterial existences, different from the operations of the human mind. Secondly, that want of success in this attempt is the grand cause why we have received to this day, but very imperfect accounts of the intellect, and that it is ex-

\* It might be objected, that the five philosophical parties above adduced, distinguish themselves by a still greater variety of different opinions than I have mentioned. But who is able to determine all the deviations of sentiment amidst so much confusion? It may be further added, that Materialism, Idealism, Spiritualism, and Scepticism, are merely Ideals, which can only be approached, but never reached. But even a mere inclination to the opinions of these sects, as it is more imperceptible, appears the more plausible, and is, on that account, the more dangerous, since the confusion not only remains the same, but also receives a greater appearance of truth.

tremely

tremely doubtful whether or not this faculty can form any solid judgments concerning immaterial existences. Thirdly, that the incorrect and ambiguous descriptions of sense and intellect have produced as incorrect and ambiguous descriptions of reason, and that therefore we have no certain authority for assigning to this faculty, a power of penetrating into the invisible regions of immaterial objects. And lastly, that as it is to sense, intellect, and reason, that we are indebted for all our knowledge, and as these faculties are not yet completely understood, we need not therefore wonder that the limits of what can be known by man are still unsettled, and of course either boldly transgressed, or too fearfully shunned, and this in matters which not only can but ought to be known.

To this historical sketch of philosophic opinions it may be objected—that it is unsupported by authority; but this Treatise being addressed to the learned, the cause of truth will, I hope, lose nothing by this deficiency, which may be easily remedied as soon as it shall be thought necessary. My principal aim is brevity, and a rigorous accuracy

racy in quoting names and passages would have very considerably encreased the size of this work.—Some may think that the diffentions of philosophers are not so great as I have described them. Suppose them not so great ; What is the reason of this ? Has any one of those parties gained a complete victory over the others ? Is evidence become stronger or conviction more unshaken ? No. The reason of it is, the prevailing indifference towards the science of Metaphysics ; a certain fear of losing quickly those conquests which it requires much labour and toil to make in this field, and a general desire of excelling rather in matters of Natural Philosophy, where a more certain reputation may be gained with more ease and at much less expence.—It is thought by some, that Materialism, Spiritualism, Idealism, and Scepticism must die away of themselves, now that we have formed the happy resolution of bringing every thing to the test of experiment, and that, therefore, the best thing we can do is to leave them to themselves and their fate, without meddling any further in these controversies. But I have clearly shown already, when describing the principles of  
the



the Eclecticks, that whoever would philosophise on the human mind, must necessarily fall into the hands of some one or other of these sects, and when he comes to see, that the very contrary is asserted by an opposite party, to those truths of which he is persuaded, it would be very unphilosophical not to examine who is wrong and who right; or to suppose, that the opinion of his opponent will die away of itself, merely because he leaves him to himself and to his fate. The excuse that two men cannot always be of the same opinion, is very superficial when applied to the fundamental parts of a science, such as sense, understanding, and reason. Two opposite opinions regarding any of these three points, if they admit of any plausible defence, give a direct evidence of the weak state in which the philosophy of the human mind still lies, and loudly call upon every friend of truth and science seriously to investigate the cause of that never ceasing repugnance in sentiment, which must necessarily reside in the very vitals of the science, or in the most hidden texture of human thoughts.

To

To judge the better of what I am still to treat, I must beg the reader to recollect, that I have introduced those philosophic opinions, merely with a view to point out some of the occasions which have contributed towards the discovery of the Kantean principles. Professor Kant wanted to ascertain, among other things, the bounds of human knowledge, particularly with regard to the existencies of immaterial objects; or in other words, to find out a general criterion of what is knowable. He observed, as already mentioned, that this criterion must be looked for within and not without man, and that, therefore, an enquiry into the nature of the reasoning, judging, and sensitive faculties must be attempted. He undertook this enquiry, but first consulted the opinions of other philosophers concerning the precise nature of those mental faculties. Wherein these opinions consisted, and in what light Kant has considered them, I have already explained. It remains, therefore, that agreeably to the plan I have laid down, I should now acquaint the reader with those farther measures which Professor Kant thought the most proper to adopt in order to answer the question, which

which I have noticed above, namely, "What is knowable?"

Professors Kant above all, considered maturely, how an answer to this important question must be qualified, if it shall be of any use to the world. He saw, that it must either be so framed in point of thought and expression as to be universally understood and acknowledged as true, by every thinking man who is no stranger to the idiom of the language in which it is conveyed, or it will increase the number of disappointments in metaphysical pursuits, over which the Sceptic triumphs, as an ocular confirmation of his doctrines. In short, the answer must be universally evident. The endeavours at universal evidence in principle, amidst so much contrariety of opinion, have, indeed, been ranked among the vain attempts sometimes made to unite the various religious Creeds of the Christian churches under one head. But those men who entertain so unfavourable an opinion of the possibility of universal evidence in principle, ought to confine this opinion to the lower classes of a nation, where the gradations of knowledge and ignorance may render a discordance of thought

H

and

and principle unavoidable, although it must be granted, that even in these darker regions, certain truths regarding what is right and wrong, &c. are universally acknowledged and respected. If those men apply the same opinion to the case of speculative philosophy, or the preceding question under consideration, and think that universal evidence is equally impossible in both, they may be instanced as the best refutation of their own opinion. For, by thus freely declaring their opinion on a speculative point, which the possibility of universal evidence certainly is, they clearly show that they must be in possession of some arguments in favour of that opinion. Now, if these arguments are solid and completely true, they have, by their own example, demonstrated the possibility of universal evidence in speculative philosophy; if, on the other hand, they contain not the full truths, they will be of little use in demonstrating the contrary. And, indeed, can any man speak, or write, or construct a system of opinions, or correct the opinions of other men, without *at least imagining*, that the premises from which he deduces his reasonings are universally granted. If he does not imagine this,

he

he cannot hope to be understood, much less to give or receive conviction. Besides, there is a fact which most unequivocally proves, that speculative philosophy is susceptible of universal evidence. Is not Logic a speculative science? Is it not complete in its parts, and has not each of its essential parts, for many centuries past, been completely understood and universally acknowledged as true? Why then, should Metaphysics, or that science which treats of existencies inaccessible to the senses, and which has its place in Speculative Philosophy immediately after Logic, be incapable of equal evidence? Why may it not afford mankind a precise and clear knowledge, if not of the remarkable phenomena in the invisible world, at least of the true bounds of our ignorance. The question, therefore, "What is knowable?" is certainly capable of an universally evident answer: and Professor Kant very justly demands that it should be so.

But how is this possibility to be realised?—The first step which Professor Kant took to realise it, was, that of endeavouring to secure himself from mixing in his arguments—the principles of Materialism, Spiritualism, Idealism, and Scepticism,

because such a mixture can never produce universal evidence. The second step which he took was this; "he endeavoured to get, if possible, at that point of delusion which has prevented these parties from an union in principle." And this point of delusion he discovered to lie in their respective methods of philosophising.

In order to determine the nature and strength of the powers of Reason, Understanding, Sense, and Knowledge.

I. The Materialists have examined very minutely the knowledge which they have of external objects, and of the organization of man. To this they have joined an enquiry into memory and the associations of the imagination, and from the knowledge they had acquired of these objects, they derived the nature and extent of the various mental faculties.

II. The Idealists finding that the senses are liable to deceive, had nothing real left as objects of enquiry, but the ideas in their minds; they derived therefore the nature and extent of the mental faculties from their knowledge of the world of ideas.

III. The



III. The Spiritualists, being persuaded that they not only have knowledge of material, but also of immaterial objects, derived from this knowledge the nature and extent of the mental faculties.

IV. The Sceptics, from the inconsistency and fallacy which they had observed in human descriptions of things, formed such notions of the mental faculties, as distinguish the sect to which they belong.

Professor Kant observed, that in explaining the Power of Knowledge, which comprehends Reason, Understanding, and Sense, it would be erroneous to derive it from our pretended knowledge of the nerves, the brain, the visible and invisible worlds, and that we ought first of all to enquire into the true nature and constitution of this power, before we can possibly ascertain what the nature and extent of that knowledge is, which we are able to acquire of the nerves, the brain, the visible and invisible worlds. Those four sects, as already mentioned, did not enquire first into the nature and constitution of the Power of Knowledge, in order to determine thereby the nature and extent of that knowledge which can be acquired of the objects  
in

in the world. They did just the contrary. They first formed arbitrary notions of the essential properties of the things around them, and from these notions they derived the nature and extent of the Power of Knowledge. The Materialists having discovered, that an essential property of the things we know is extension, converted the Power of Knowledge into a mechanical faculty of organization, and confined it to the field of extended beings. The Idealists, observing that extension can be no essential property of real objects, denied the existence of the external world, and made the Power of Knowledge consist in reason, or the intellect, which faculty, they think, can alone acquaint us with the true nature of objects. It is on the same principle, that the Spiritualists, from their pretended knowledge of spirits and immaterial objects, whose essential property they have discovered to be simplicity, assert a power of knowing spirits and immaterial objects, as well as material, and make this power to be a compound of the faculties of sense, understanding, and reason. The Sceptics pretending to know nothing certainly of the true and essential properties of things, do not agree

agree concerning what they shall make of the Power of Knowledge. These four sects confounded two questions, which are essentially different from one another, namely, the question, "Wherein consists the Power of Knowledge?" with the question, "Wherein consists the essence of the things which we know?" Instead of answering the first, they endeavoured to answer the last. They thought the best way to determine the power and extent of human knowledge, was to penetrate as deeply as possible into the essence or nature of things, and to see how far we could proceed in our knowledge of them. But this was the most perverted method they could have possibly chosen. For we must evidently endeavour, first, to get completely acquainted with those conditions in man, which render knowledge possible, or make the constitution of the Power of Knowledge, before we can even think of determining what, and how much this power can know of the essential properties or essence of things. But those conditions which make knowledge possible, must lie in the knowing faculty, and not in the things known. It is, therefore, perfectly and completely vain, to institute deep enquiries  
into

into the objects of the visible and invisible world, into the nerves, fibres, and vibrations, in order to learn what the Power of Knowledge is. All these things are merely objects of knowledge ; they cannot even afford so much information, as to tell us wherein knowledge consists, much less wherein the *Power* of Knowledge may consist.

I have dwelt upon this topic for a considerable time, because I thought it of the last importance to Philosophy, and because I find, that even our greatest philosophers, for whom I profess the highest regard, and whose names I shall mention, as soon as a more favourable opportunity occurs, have adopted the same erroneous methods of philosophizing. They indeed analyze the powers of the human mind with great skill and ingenuity, and deserve, on this account, to be diligently studied ; but it is a misfortune, that these great men could not give any description of those powers, without deriving it, at least in part, from their supposed knowledge of material or immaterial objects.

Professor Kant shews, that, in describing or examining the powers of Reason, Understanding, and Sense, or the Power of Knowledge, we have nothing

at

at all to do with a simple spirit, or the soul, and with compound substances, or the external things. We have only to consider certain faculties, by which we know, reason, and judge of these things. These faculties are objects of consciousness, and must be considered separately and independently of the qualities of those things which are known by means of them. If these faculties are completely examined, and accurately understood, then and only then shall we be able to judge, whether such faculties can belong merely to the organization, or to a simple spirit.

When any work on the powers of the mind, therefore, contains assertions of the following description—If we conceive the mind immaterial, of which, I think, we have very strong proofs, we shall find it difficult to affix a meaning to impressions made upon it; or, Thought is a property of the nervous system—we may reckon upon it, that such a work, however acute and just the deductions be which it contains, is yet built upon a foundation, which, involving an essential fault, must make the whole superstructure totter, and forever exclude it from universal approbation.

Is it then possible to explain the Power of Knowledge in general, without having recourse to an accurate and extensive knowledge of things? Can we get well acquainted with any power, without examining very accurately, and very minutely, those effects which it produces?

Professors Kant by no means denies, that we know powers only by means of their effects; he is far from asserting, that our examination of these effects should not be accurate and minute; but he is totally against all accurate and minute examination of any single immaterial, as well as material object, as far as it respects our present purpose. An individual and minute knowledge of one or more individual bodies or spirits, is perfectly useless towards ascertaining the Power of Knowledge in general. To find out the true nature of this power, we must abstract from all particular knowledge of particular objects, and examine the properties of knowledge in general, or the common nature of all our knowledge.

But, say you, it seems impossible to examine the common nature of knowledge, without having recourse to particular knowledge of particular things.



things. It really does seem so. But it is in fact otherwise; and I may boldly assert, that we have here a remarkable exception to the maxim, "That every thing is easy in theory but difficult in practice;" for here really something appears very difficult, nay, almost impossible, in theory, which yet is very easy in practice, as is shewn in the Extract of Kant's Principles, which will presently follow.

Supposing, therefore, that it is possible to examine the common nature of knowledge, without calling to our assistance minute details of particular knowledge, regarding a great variety of particular objects; it will, I hope, be clear, at least, that we ought, at all events, to begin with considering this common nature of knowledge, if ever we would get rightly acquainted with the specific difference of particular knowledge, and the power of knowledge in general. And this I affirm upon the principle, that to know the essential properties of any power, and those we should always examine first of a power, we must find out the common nature of its effects.

How then can we discover the common properties of all human knowledge, and exhibit them in a manner universally intelligible and evident? Upon a complete and accurate answer to this question, as I have just shewn, immediately depends all the possibility of giving an universally intelligible and satisfactory explanation of what constitutes the true and comprehensible nature of the Power of Knowledge, or the faculties of Reason, Understanding, and Sense. For if the most common properties of all our knowledge be not ascertained, the most common exertions, or the most essential nature of their cause, which is the Power of Knowledge, cannot be clearly and completely understood, and if the Power of Knowledge remain in part a secret, the notions we have of Reason, Understanding, and Sense, the component parts of that power, cannot be accurate and complete, but must, of course, remain deficient and partial.

I shall, therefore, endeavour to exhibit that method of enquiry which Professor Kant has used in his attempts to discover, the common properties of human knowledge. I doubt not but the reader will find his mode of philosophising on this impor-

tant

tant subject highly interesting, and worthy of attention, especially as his principal aim is universal evidence, and as he is, of course, obliged to keep his arguments and views of things equally distant from those of the four dissenting parties in the philosophic world.

But as I perceive that I cannot well avoid entering into some detail of his fundamental principles of theoretical philosophy, in order to particularise his method of enquiring into the common characteristics of human knowledge, I must beg the reader to remark, first, that among the Kantian Principles which I am going to adduce, some more will occur than seem necessary to this end; but having promised in this Treatise to give a general introduction to Kant's Philosophy, and not merely to his speculations on human knowledge; and finding it necessary, for the sake of order and perspicuity, to put his theoretical principles one near another as closely as possible, I thought it not improper to give a complete view of all his speculative principles, that is, as far as is necessary to those references which are essential in order to illustrate the results of his philosophy concerning

Morals

Morals and Religion, as well as his manner of investigating speculative objects. I must remark, that the principles which I shall adduce are altogether founded upon the *Criticism of Pure Reason*, some of them being translated, and others derived from it, as necessary consequences, so as to form a complete introductory view of this important work, upon which all the other Kantian writings are grounded. I must further remark, that this view of the Kantian principles is not at all intended to convince the reader of their truth; for this would require a separate work \*. I have completely done my duty in enumerating them so as to render it visible by which way they have been discovered, and how they can lead to those results which I shall explain in the sequel of this work.

I shall, accordingly, delineate the method of investigating the common properties of human knowledge, as well as those objects necessarily connected with such an investigation, in the following positions which I have marked out with numbers in order to make occasional references.

\* I have almost completed a work of the above description, and shall announce it more particularly in the course of these pages.

## KANT'S

## THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES.

## PRINCIPLE I.

THE most proper method of enquiring into the nature of the Power of Knowledge, and the faculties of Reason, Understanding, and Sense, is that which sets out with principles universally granted by the Systems of Materialism, Spiritualism, Idealism, and Scepticism, and, which, by an accurate deduction from what was granted, *forces* these dissenting parties to coincide in one unshaken sentiment concerning the particular nature of the mental faculties and their operations.

## PRINCIPLE II.

All these sects perfectly agree, that man is conscious of his thinking, conceiving, knowing, perceiving, judging, and reasoning, but disagree concerning the particular nature of the objects conceived, perceived, known, &c.

## PRINCIPLE

### PRINCIPLE III.

To explain the Power of Knowledge, and the faculties of Reason, Understanding, and Sense, it is requisite to analyse Perception, Conception, Knowledge, Judgment, and Reasoning, without regard to the particular objects perceived, conceived, known, &c.\*

### PRINCIPLE IV.

Whatever the object perceived, known, &c. be, there is a great difference between our knowledge of an object and the object of our knowledge. They can never constitute one and the same thing.

### PRINCIPLE V.

In every knowledge, perception, &c. there is something which refers to an object, and something which refers to the knowing or perceiving subject.

\* If the four grand philosophical parties, as they must do, agree to the second and third principle, they must agree to all the rest which I am going to adduce. I need not mention that the principles which will follow after the fourth are new in the strictest sense of the word.

### PRINCIPLE



## PRINCIPLE VI.

In every perception, knowledge, &c. that which refers to the object may be called matter \*, and that which refers to the perceiving subject may be called form of perception, or knowledge.

## PRINCIPLE VII.

The matter in every perception, knowledge, &c. must be given, and the form must be produced by the mind.

## PRINCIPLE VIII.

The given matter in every perception, knowledge, &c. is a variety, and the form produced by the mind is unity. Thus, in viewing a rose, we distinguish two things, first, a variety, and then a connection of that variety into a regular and

\* All that is in time and space must have matter and form, that is, it must be a variety connected into one whole; the variety connected is the matter, and the connection of the variety considered separately is the form. Thus, in a house, the materials of which it is composed, constitute the matter, and the connection of the materials constitute the form of the house.

figured whole ; which connection makes the thing to be one and not many things, gives it unity, and may be called form, while the variety may be called the matter of the rose.

#### PRINCIPLE IX.

That a given variety can occur in our perceptions, knowledge, &c. supposes a Receptive Faculty in the mind, or a Receptivity which is totally passive, and that a variety received is connected into knowledge, perceptions, &c. this requires an active faculty of the mind, which may be called Spontaneity.

#### PRINCIPLE X.

The Spontaneity acts, the form or mode of its action is connection. It not only acts, therefore, but connects. The receptivity receives ; the form or mode of receiving is, that it receives a variety.

#### PRINCIPLE XI.

There are only two kinds of varieties in general, one, whose parts lie without and near each other,

other, and a second, whose parts follow one after another in strict succession.

## PRINCIPLE XII.

The Receptivity, as far as it receives varieties of the first description, may be called external sense, and as far as it receives varieties of the second description, internal sense.

## PRINCIPLE XIII.

Those ideas which immediately arise in consequence of our external sense being affected are external perceptions or external intuitions, and those which immediately arise in consequence of our internal sense being affected are internal intuitions or perceptions. Thus the idea which arises in the mind in consequence of any man affecting our external sense by his presence is an external perception or intuition; because the variety of which the phenomenon man is composed is a variety of parts lying one without and near another. In the same manner, any emotion, or passion, or action in man affecting our internal sense, furnishes materials for an internal intuition or perception,

whose characteristic is, that it immediately arises in consequence of such affection, and involves a variety of parts of which one lies not near, but always after another, as is the real case with passions and actions which cannot be said to form any breadth or plain, but have all their minutest parts, strictly following one after another.\*

#### PRINCIPLE XIV.

To form an external and internal Intuition, three different species or acts of the Spontaneity are requisite; the first, which takes up as it were, and arranges the affections of our external and internal sense, and, on this account, may be called synthesis of apprehension; the second, which reproduces what has been connected and collected, in order that the immediately preceding affections may be annexed to those immediately succeeding; and for this reason this act may be called a synthetic act of the reproductive imagination; the third, which forms one Intuition of what has

\* All the Kantian Principles which I have adduced and shall adduce, are of great importance to Practical Philosophy, as will be shewn in the sequel of these pages.

been apprehended and connected, and this act may be considered as a synthesis of Recognition.

To apprehend, connect, and reproduce, especially to connect the affections of our external and internal senses into intuitions, is *to think* in the widest sense of the word.

#### PRINCIPLE XV.

To have external and internal Intuitions, therefore, necessarily requires in the human representing faculty; first, a receptivity which receives for intuitions the materials which could not be produced by the mind from nothing; and secondly, a spontaneity or a faculty which connects the received materials, agreeably to the laws of its nature, into intuitions.

#### PRINCIPLE XVI.

That in external Intuitions, a variety of parts lying one without and near another can occur, necessarily supposes in our external sense, such a structure and conformation, as renders possible the receiving a variety of this description. There is consequently, a certain structure or conformation  
of

of our external sense which contains the ground of possibility, that in our external intuitions a variety of parts lying one without and near another, can occur.

### PRINCIPLE XVII.

That in our Internal Intuitions a variety of parts strictly following one after another, and never lying one near another can occur, necessarily supposes in our internal sense, such a structure and conformation as enables it to receive a variety of this description. There is consequently a certain structure and conformation in our internal sense, which contains the ground of possibility, that in our internal intuitions, a variety of parts strictly following one after another, and never lying one near another, as in a plain, can occur.\*

### PRINCIPLE XVIII.

Our external and internal senses have a common nature, which is, that both receive, and that both  
are

\* If any of my readers should find it too difficult to read through all the Principles at once which I have numbered, he may pass them over and go to the application of them. But I must



are passive; that both are receptivities, and have their common properties comprehended in the notion of receptivity in general, under which they stand as species. Their distinguishing characteristics or specific difference lie in the peculiar nature of what they receive, or in the being one without and near another, and in the following one after another of the variety which they receive. These two last circumstances mark out the different and distinguishing conformations or forms of our external and internal sense; while the receptivity or the faculty of receiving in general, without these modifications, constitutes their matter.\*

#### PRINCIPLE XIX.

As these forms or modifications of our external and internal sense are impressed on the varie-

must remark, that I could, consistently with my design, omit none of them, and that if they shall be understood, they must be read in connection, because one depends on the other.

\* The term Matter signifies here that which is any how determinable. In the case of external sense the capability of receiving or being passive is something determinable; for the mode of receiving and being passive, may be determined various ways. Hence the capability of receiving is the matter, and the mode of receiving, the form of this capability.

ties

ties which they receive ; it follows, that our external and internal intuitions which exhibit to the mind the varieties received, will also exhibit to the mind those modifications impressed on them by the peculiar conformations of our external and internal sense.

#### PRINCIPLE XX.

The two peculiar modifications impressed on those varieties exhibited in intuitions may be viewed separately, and, therefore, furnish materials for two particular ideas, one of which will, in consequence, comprehend the being one without and near another of the variety, and the other the following one after another of the variety.

#### PRINCIPLE XXI.

When the spontaneity connects the being one without the other and near another of the variety exhibited in all external intuitions, it begets an idea which evidently represents the general form of that variety or matter contained in all our external intuitions, and which is nothing more than the usual idea we have of space. For when we  
analyse

analyze our idea of space, we find it imply no more than, first, a variety in general; secondly, a variety whose parts lie one without and near another; and thirdly, a variety in general, whose parts are intimately connected; all which three points are essential characteristics of the modification impressed by external sense upon the variety contained in all our external intuitions.

#### PRINCIPLE XXII.

When the Spontaneity connects the following one after another of the variety exhibited in all our internal Intuitions, it begets an idea which manifestly represents the general form of that variety or matter contained in all our internal intuitions. This is the exact idea we have of time. For the idea of time implies nothing more than, first, a variety in general; secondly, a variety whose parts are following one after another; thirdly, a variety whose parts are intimately connected.

## PRINCIPLE XXXIII.

The idea of space exhibits to the mind the general form of external intuitions; for in every external intuition there is, first, something given, that is, a something not produced by the mind, a something referring to an object different from the Intuition; secondly, a certain modification or determination of that something which is given. This modification or determination is the being one without the other of that which is given and originates in the conformation of the receptivity of our external sense; thirdly, a certain connection of the variety thus given and modified. Now when we separate the share which the mind has in producing external intuitions, we shall find that it is the connection and the being one without the other of that which was given; but both these particulars constitute the general form of external intuitions, as well as the idea of space. Hence the idea of space is the exact representation of the general form of external intuitions.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE XXIV.

The idea of time exhibits to the mind the general form of internal intuitions, which may be shown by the same process of reasoning with that immediately preceding.

## PRINCIPLE XXV.

The ideas of time and space are ideas *à priori*, that is to say, they have the objects to which they refer in the mind, and not in any thing which is distinct from the mind; they are, therefore, necessary and universal, and the more so, because they express the general form of all our external and internal intuitions.

## PRINCIPLE XXVI.

The ideas of time and space are not only ideas, but also intuitions *à priori*, because they arise immediately in consequence of our receptivity being effected.

## PRINCIPLE XXVII.

Intuitions *à priori* stand opposed to those *à postèriori*. The difference is, the objects of the first lie within and those of the last without the mind. The first are, on that account, also called pure, and the last empirical intuitions.

## PRINCIPLE XXVIII.

The changes and alterations in our receptivity when it is affected, are Sensations; and as all our intuitions arise in consequence of such changes or alterations in our Receptivity, they may so far be called sensations, agreeably to the rule that two words expressing two things of some similar properties, may, when there is no danger of confounding them, change their places.

## PRINCIPLE XXIX.

Consciousness is an act of the mind by which man is enabled to refer in his intuitions and ideas that to the mind which is the produce of the mind,  
and



and that to the external things which refers to them or is their produce.\*

PRINCIPLE XXX.

The number of Intuitions which the mind begets is immense, and man would be lost in an infinite crowd of particulars if he had no faculty to reduce them into certain order.

PRINCIPLE XXXI.

There are, for this reason, a certain kind of ideas which are immediately formed from intuitions, and which contain their common nature. This kind of ideas may be called Conceptions, and are begotten by the Understanding. Hence the Understanding is a faculty of forming conceptions.

PRINCIPLE XXXII.

In every Conception we distinguish two things; first, its matter, which is a variety already represented in an intuition, or simply, which is an in-

\* Consciousness has hitherto been defined to be a power of immediate Knowledge; but this definition is very deficient.

tuition;

tuition; fecondly, its form which is unity or connection.

### PRINCIPLE XXXIII.

The Understanding is, therefore, nearly the fame fpontaneity which is active in begetting intuitions. Both connect a variety given, only the produce of their connection is different, which circumftance is the caufe why we may divide the connecting faculty of the mind into fpontaneity of the firft degree, and into that of the fecond degree, and denominate the firft faculty Simple Apprehenfion, and the fecond Understanding. Simple Apprehenfion begets intuitions and the Understanding conceptions. Intuitions immediately refer to their objects, and conceptions only mediately, that is, by means of thofe intuitions from which they have been formed.

### PRINCIPLE XXXIV.

The Conceptions immediately arifing from the intuitions are fo numerous as to overload the memory, if they were not reduced to claffes adapted to the capacity of man. Hence from Conception,  
other

conceptions are formed, which comprehend only the common nature of the former, and are again distributed into species, the species into genera, the genera into tribes, the tribes into orders, and the orders into classes.\*

### PRINCIPLE XXXV.

In all Conceptions the principal thing to be attended to is the form ; for the matter of them is intuition, to which they all must be ultimately reducible, and which has already been considered. The form of all conceptions, wherein soever it may consist, must be unity, for it arises from connection, and the result of all connection of the mind must be unity. This unity, which shall soon be more nearly described, is a unity under which all things must be comprehensible, if they shall be conceivable. This unity is, therefore, the general form of all that is conceivable ; and as nothing is knowable which is not conceivable, that unity may

\* An accurate and attentive reader will understand these Principles tolerably well at the first perusal. If, however, some obscurity should appear to remain, it will in a great measure be removed, when I come to make an application in this Treatise.

be called objective unity, because no object can fall under any human cognizance unless it is capable of being connected into this unity, or of being conceived.

#### PRINCIPLE XXXVI.

The idea of the objective unity of a conception, is itself a conception ; but it is a conception *à priori*, and, therefore, necessary, as well as universal.

#### PRINCIPLE XXXVII.

To comprehend the variety represented by an intuition under the objective unity is to judge ; to produce the objective unity from an intuition is to judge synthetically ; to connect the objective unity, already produced with an intuition given, is to judge analytically.

*Note.* To connect the objective unity with an intuition, and to produce an objective unity, is as much as to produce and connect that conception, in which the objective unity is inherent.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE XXXVIII.

Every analytical judgment is a judgment *à priori*, because we unfold only what already lies in the conception; for instance, all bodies are extended; this is an analytical judgment, because the predicate extended lies already in the subject, or in the conception of a body, and to get at this predicate, there is no occasion to have recourse to an intuition of a particular body; for we find it in the very conception of a body, and may therefore know it *à priori*, that is, without consulting particular experience.

## PRINCIPLE XXXIX.

A synthetical judgment *à priori* is that, where the objective unity is produced from an intuition *à priori*. Of this cast are all mathematical judgments; they are grounded in the intuition of space, which is *à priori*; hence the invincible necessity of these judgments; space is necessary, that is, the contrary of it is impossible, and its properties, which are represented in mathematical judgments, must of course be necessary.

M

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE XL.

A synthetical judgment *à posteriori* is that where the objective unity is produced from intuitions *à posteriori*, that is, from such whose objects are different from the operations of the mind, and have an external existence. Of this class are all experimental judgments, for they refer to objects without the mind.

## PRINCIPLE XLI.

As the objective unity is inherent in conceptions, whose form it constitutes, and as conceptions are produced by the judging act of the understanding, there will of course be as many different modifications of the objective unity, as there are essentially different judging acts of the understanding, by which it was produced\*.

## PRINCIPLE XLII.

The most difficult as well as the first duty of a philosophy of the human mind, will be to ascer-

\* I remark here, once for all, that there is none of the principles I have adduced, and shall adduce, which I could not prove to be of important practical use.



tain the exact number of these judging acts of the understanding.

### PRINCIPLE XLIII.

The number of these acts may be completely discovered, by forming an accurate conception of judgment in general, by abstracting from all particular objects of judgment, and by making the following use of these intimations :

### PRINCIPLE XLIV.

Judgment in general, according to what has been said (XXXVII), is the comprehending of a variety, represented by an intuition under the objective unity. This conception of judgment in general will lead to the discovery of the exact number of the different judging acts of the Understanding, when the following questions are attended to, first, **WHAT CAN BE COMPREHENDED UNDER THE OBJECTIVE UNITY?** Nothing else than intuitions; but these intuitions, what can they represent? Either properties of a thing, or effects of a thing, or parts of a whole. When particular properties, or things, are comprehended under the objective unity, the judgment is

M 2

called

called CATEGORICAL; when particular effects, or causes, it is called HYPOTHETICAL; when particular parts, or wholes, it is called DISJUNCTIVE; and these three species of judgments, expressing the relations between things and properties, causes and effects, parts and a whole, make one class, which is called JUDGMENTS OF RELATIONS. Secondly, HOW MUCH CAN BE COMPREHENDED UNDER THE OBJECTIVE UNITY? The answer is easy, namely, either one of the things alluded to, or many, or all. When one individual thing is comprehended in the objective unity, the judgment is INDIVIDUAL or SINGULAR; when many, it is PARTICULAR; when all, it is UNIVERSAL. The class to which these three species of Judgments belong, may be entitled JUDGMENTS OF QUANTITY.—Thirdly, HOW CAN THE COMPREHENDING BE CARRIED ON? Either so as really to unite an intuition with a conception, and this would be an AFFIRMATIVE Judgment, or so as to exclude something from a conception, and this will be a NEGATIVE Judgment, or so as to exclude a whole empire of intuitions, without determining thereby the conception in any degree, and this is  
an

an INFINITE Judgment. These three species of Judgments form a class which may be encribed JUDGMENTS OF QUALITY. — Fourthly, WHERE HAVE THE THINGS COMPREHENDED UNDER THE OBJECTIVE UNITY THEIR SEAT? Do they exist within or without the mind? When they exist in the Understanding alone, or are mere conceivable things, of which it is not certain that they really exist without the mind; then the Judgment is PROBLEMATICAL; for instance, there are probably rational inhabitants in the moon, which must be granted to be very conceivable; when the things comprehended under the objective unity are really conceived with a belief that they are so as conceived, then this will be an ASSERTIVE Judgment; for instance, man has a natural regard for virtue; when they are so conceived as to carry along with them the conviction that, according to the constitution of the Understanding, they cannot be conceived otherwise, such a Judgment, whether affirmative, or negative, has the character of NECESSITY; for instance, in every right lined triangle, two sides taken together are always longer than

than the third. These three last species of Judgments add nothing to the contents of a Judgment, as those of quantity, quality, and relation do, and therefore may be classed under the title of JUDGMENTS OF MODALITY, which only mark out those faculties of the mind, by which they have been formed, or determine that place where the thing judged of, or comprehended, has its seat.\*

#### PRINCIPLE XLV.

The exact number of the judging acts of the Understanding may be represented in the following table :

\* It might be remarked, that our common books on Logic contain a similar division of Judgments. But it ought not to be forgot, that these books possess no argument to establish the correctness and completeness of their divisions, that they have not perceived the true nature of the judging acts of the understanding, and that they do not perfectly comprehend the genuine utility of judgments, as may be clearly seen from the loose and indeterminate descriptions which they give of conception and judgment itself; where to judge is no more than to put together ideas, or to exclude one from another, or to perceive their agreement and disagreement by comparison.

Quantity

1.

Quantity of Judgments.

Universal.

Particular.

Individual, or singular.

2.

Quality of Judgments.

Affirmative.

Negative.

Infinite.

3.

Relation of Judgments.

Categorical.

Hypothetical.

Disjunctive.

4.

Modality of Judgments.

Problematical.

Affertive.

Apodictical, or necessary.

PRIN.

## PRINCIPLE XLVI.

As every judging act comprehends a variety contained in our intuition under objective unity, or, what is the same, as it unites the many exhibited by an intuition in one conception, we may bring these uniting or comprehending acts of the Understanding under conceptions also. These conceptions will contain and express the results of the acts, as well as the acts themselves ; they will, in consequence, contain the various modifications of the objective unity, which are no other than the results of the acts mentioned. As those acts and results are of a primary nature, the conceptions themselves will be so likewise ; and as the exact number of those acts and results are already ascertained, the exact number of these conceptions is easily discovered, and may be thus brought into one view :

The results of the comprehending acts of the Understanding are contained in the following conceptions :

Of



1.

Of Quantity.

Unity.

Multitude.

Totality.

2.

Of Quality.

Reality.

Negation.

Limitation.

3.

Of Relation.

Substance. Accident.

Cause. Effect.

Concurrence in Action  
and Re-action.

4.

Of Modality.

Possibility. Impossibility.

Existence. Non-Existence.

Necessity. Contingency.

## PRINCIPLE XLVII.

These conceptions, being the primitive and original produce of the Understanding alone, are more properly called pure intellectual notions, or, with Aristotle, Categories\*, and to think them in their genuine purity, we must abstract from the matter of all intuitions and conceptions, and consider them, as they ought to be considered, as the original share which the intellect has in our con-

\* Aristotle already formed the design, well worthy of so acute a philosopher, of collecting those fundamental notions of the intellect which he called Categories. But having no principle to guide his research, and not knowing that they must be derived from an accurate conception of Judgment in general, which he likewise had not formed, he gathered them as they came under his view, by chance, and first picked up ten Categories (Predicaments,) to which he afterwards added five more, which he called Post Predicaments. But his catalogue remained nevertheless very deficient. It contained the notions of When, Where, Motion, Action, Passion, &c. which are altogether improperly introduced. Locke, believing he had discovered these elementary notions of the Intellect in the field of experience, did not hesitate to derive them from this quarter, but fell into great inconsistency, in deducing from these very notions such knowledge as lies beyond all experience. Hume saw very well this inconsistency, but not knowing whence the Understanding gets these notions, he likewise derived them from experience, not considering that the Understanding itself might perhaps be the author of experience, and this by the very notions he derived from experience.

ceptions,

ceptions, that is, the most general forms of our conceptions, or, as the being connected of the variety in our conceptions, or as the determinate modifications of the objective unity, which is the most general form of all our conceptions.

#### PRINCIPLE XLVIII.

The Categories thus considered are the twelve primary forms of all conceivable objects ; they are species, and the objective unity is their genus. They are not derived from experience, but make all experience possible ; for every object of experience must be conceivable, and stand under the general forms of all human conceptions, otherwise it cannot be experience.

#### PRINCIPLE XLIX.

The intellect which conceives its own original modes of conceiving, is a pure intellect ; the conceptions formed of these modes of conceiving are pure conceptions, that is, they are *à priori*, and necessary, because we cannot think without them, and universal, because all human thought springs up from them as its primary fountain.

## PRINCIPLE L.

The Categories abstracted from all conception of external objects have no meaning, are empty shades, forms without substance. They imply not even so much as a unity, or multitude, or substance in general; for if they did, they would indicate that they had already been united to some variety in time or space; but to conceive a Category in its purity we must abstract from all variety, and consider only those acts of the intellect which are requisite to beget a unity and multitude in time or space, and to produce the conception of a substance. If we consider only those acts of the intellect, and attend to the results of them, which are the being united of the variety, we clearly conceive a Category, and shall allow, that in this sense of the word, the Categories, as they are only the being united, or the connection of a variety, cannot, as such, be any notions of things, but only forms of notions, and, therefore, without meaning.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE LI.

Although the Categories considered by themselves are void of meaning, it does not follow, that they, therefore, are useless; for being the primary produce of the pure intellect, they not only show in a plain manner, that this faculty can of itself know nothing, but also that experience is the only field, wherein the pure intellect can give life and substance to the Categories, and make them the vehicles of real and substantial knowledge, as will be immediately shown\*.

## PRINCIPLE LII.

The Categories express a synthesis or connection in general. As nothing but a variety can be connected, it is clear, that the end of the Categories is to connect a variety. But as they are modes of connection in general, it follows that the varieties to be connected by them must be general. Now, we

\* It might be remarked, that if Kant's Philosophy confines the Intellect to experience, it has a tendency to prevent man from knowing objects that lie *beyond* experience, and is therefore only of a negative use. But Police is also, in a great measure, of a mere negative use; for it principally aims at preventing disorders in society; and what state could subsist without Police?

have

have only two general varieties, namely, time and space; hence by the Categories alone can time and space be connected. But time is a variety more general than space; for it comprehends more than space; because, whatever is in space must be in time also; but all that is in time may not be in space also, as for instance, a thought, &c. Hence by the Categories time is more immediately connected than space.

### PRINCIPLE LIII.

It might be asked of what use are the combinations of the Categories with time? These combinations are a species of notions which keep the middle between the Categories and Intuitions, and make an application of the Categories to Intuitions possible. For as these notions contain the pure synthesis of a Category, with time or the general form of all Intuitions, they, as it were, melt the Categories and our Intuitions together, and confine the pure intellect to objects of intuitive knowledge, that is, to the field of experience, so that it is vain to expect from the pure intellect any knowledge of immaterial existences.

PRIN-



## PRINCIPLE LIV.

These intermediate notions, which form, as it were, the bridge between the Categories and intuitions, are called the Schemata of the Categories, because they exhibit the most general outlines of all that shall be conceivable by the Categories or by the primary comprehending acts of the pure intellect.

## PRINCIPLE LV.

The Schema of a Category is no picture of any thing; but being the synthesis of time agreeably to a synthetical rule expressed in a Category, and all conceptions of figure arising by a synthesis of time; it follows that our conceptions of figures and pictures originate in the schematism of the pure intellect. For instance, the conception of a triangle in general which can only exist in our thoughts, because it comprehends all species of triangles and abstracts from the necessary qualifications of a particular triangle, originates only in the schema of a Category; it expresses merely a rule of synthesis in time contained in a Category,  
and

and can have no where any exact picture corresponding to it.

### PRINCIPLE LVI.

The Schemata of the Categories, which are the primary fountains of all shapes, figures in time and space, may, in the order of the Categories, be explained thus :

FIRST, The Categories of quantity have only one schema, which is expressed in the conception of a number in general. A number in general, which comprehends all particular numbers, exactly marks out the primary synthetical act of the pure intellect in begetting quantities in time in general ; for it arises from adding one to one, and expresses unity, multitude, and totality, not of a particular thing or variety, but of a variety in general, of an homogeneous variety, of time\*.

\* It will require great efforts of abstraction in the reader to conceive the Schematism of the intellect, in a perfectly clear manner. But it is perfectly sufficient if he knows in general what the term Schema means, and by what way Professor Kant arrives at this doctrine. However, I shall soon have an opportunity to make these speculations completely intelligible ; but this cannot be done in an introduction. That the Schematism of the pure intellect, which Professor Kant has discovered, is of great importance to philosophy, will soon be shown.

SECOND,

SECONDLY, The Categories of Quality, which are Reality, Negation, and Limitation, have likewise only one schema, which is expressed in our conception of a degree in general. A degree in general marks a general compound of homogeneous parts, not of time itself, but of something in time, it expresses the quantity of Being in time, as begotten by the synthetical act of the pure intellect. Being in time has quantity; for it arises, lasts for some moments, and vanishes in time; it discovers a connected variety of homogeneous parts which refer to internal sensations, and form a connected series. Now a series of sensations in time cannot be measured by a plain, or any body, but only by a degree. A degree, therefore, expresses the quantity of Being in time; it represents a reality in general, limited by negations, it exhibits the primary synthesis of the pure intellect which connects reality in time under the Categories of quality; it is, therefore, the schema of the Categories of Quality, and the most general conception of a sensible reality in time.

THIRDLY, The Categories of Relation have three schemata:

O

2. That

1. That of the Category of Substance, which is exhibited in our conception of perdurability in time. All that is in time changes; but time itself does not change. Time, therefore, connected into a conception by that synthetical act of the intellect, which begets our ideas of particular substances, becomes the most general conception of all substances; it includes perdurability in time, which is the essential characteristic of all substances, and, by thus giving the Category of substance, which expresses only a particular synthesis of the intellect, this meaning and application in time, it is, on that account, the schema of this Category.

2. That of cause and effect, which is expressed by the conception implying a regular succession of the realities in time. The intellect connects. One species of its connection is, that it makes some of the realities in time to follow upon some other realities agreeably to the laws of its constitution. This species of connection considered separately, comprehends the Categories of cause and effect, but applied to time, it is the schemata of these Categories, and presents such connection as inhering

ing in the realities of time. A conception, therefore, which implies, *first*, a general variety of time; *secondly*, succession of this variety; and, *thirdly*, a succession conformable to a rule in the intellect, is the schema of the Categories of cause and effect.

3. That of mutual concurrence, which is expressed by a conception where we find an assemblage of substances mutually determining each other. This mutual determination and connection originates in the intellect, and considered separately, is the Category of mutual concurrence; but this connection and determination considered as inhering in realities in general in time, is the schema of the Category of mutual concurrence.

FOURTHLY, The Categories of Modality have three Schemata:

1. The Schema of Possibility is a conception which exhibits the synthesis of many ideas as agreeing with the general laws of time. For instance, two contradictory properties cannot exist in the same thing at the same time, but only in different times. This conception, therefore, represents the modes in which the in-

tellekt can connect, and then the laws prescribed by time to that variety which shall be connected. It is, therefore, the schema of possibility, or conceivableness, and contains the most general features of what can be conceived.

2. The schema of existence is a conception which contains an act of connection that has really taken place, and a variety or reality in time which has really been connected by this act. It is a conception of a particular reality being determined in time, and, therefore, existing in a determinate and particular time. It is consequently the schema of that particular synthesis of the intellect which begets ideas of existences. The schema of the Category of existence, therefore, implies, first, a synthesis of the intellect, or a Category, and its effect upon time, which is a determination of a particular time, both which are the essential ingredients of all our ideas of existencies.

3. The schema of necessity is a conception implying a particular synthesis of the intellect, which begets an idea of something existing at all times. In this idea we find, *first*, a reality placed and determined in the whole of time, and, *secondly*, an  
act



act of determining or placing it in all time. The act is the Category of necessity, and the reality determined by it is the necessary thing in time. Consequently we have here a Category applied to time, or a schema of a Category; it is a schema of necessity, because it represents something as existing at all times, and because what exists at all times is necessary, and can only be destroyed with the destruction of time itself.

## T A B L E

OF THE

### SCHEMATA OF THE CATEGORIES.

1. Of Quantity.

Number, or Synthesis of mere Time.

2. Of Quality.

Degree, or Synthesis of the sensations in time.

3. Of Relation. Relation of sensations in time.

1. Perdurability.

2. Determinate Succession.

3. Determinate Co-existence.

4. Of

4. Of Modality, or how a thing belongs to time.
  1. Conceivableness, or being at any time.
  2. Being in a certain time.
  3. Being at all times.

#### PRINCIPLE LVII.

The Schemata are, therefore, determinations of time by the pure Intellect ; their use is to bring a variety of intuitions under a few heads, and thus to assist our progress in knowledge. They are the only means to give the Categories any signification, and, therefore, confine the use of the intellect to the field of experience.

#### PRINCIPLE LVIII.

All human knowledge is a compound of conceptions and intuitions. Conceptions without intuitions are empty, and intuitions without conceptions are blind. The intellect connects, or, what is the same, thinks; our senses do not think but contemplate intuitively; provided they be assisted by the Spontaneity which must necessarily connect a variety of sensations, in order to enable us to contemplate any thing. All knowledge is  
either

either *à priori*, and then it is a compound of conceptions, and intuitions *à priori*; or it is *à posteriori*, and then it is a compound of conceptions and intuitions *à posteriori*.

Conceptions are *à priori*, when the objects conceived lie within and not without the mind. Thus the conceptions we form of the acts of the intellect, &c. are altogether *à priori*. Conceptions *à posteriori* are such as are formed from intuitions *à posteriori*, and intuitions *à posteriori* are those which immediately arise when objects external to the mind work upon our senses, while intuitions *à priori* are those, whose objects lie in the mind, such as the general forms of all our intuitions.

Knowledge *à posteriori* may be called experience, empirical or experimental knowledge, and knowledge *à priori* may be called pure knowledge.

#### PRINCIPLE LIX.

An essential requisite of all Knowledge, Conceptions, and Intuitions, is Consciousness. The "I am," and the "I think," must accompany all our ideas, or else they will not belong to us nor ever become objects of our attention.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE LX.

As every Intuition of which we are conscious is a compound of intuitions, it follows that Consciousness, in putting intuitions successively together, must remain one and the same; if not, there will be many Consciousnesses in composing many Intuitions, but not one Consciousness of the whole composition or intuition.

## PRINCIPLE LXI.

There is, therefore, Identity of Consciousness, and this Identity has synthetical unity, that is, all particular acts of Consciousness which are scattered over a great extent of particular objects ultimately unite themselves in one general act of Consciousness, which is expressed when I say, I *think*.

## PRINCIPLE LXII.

The varieties represented by Intuitions, Conceptions, or Knowledge, whether *à priori* or *à posteriori*, are ultimately connected in the synthetical unity of Consciousness, and this by means of the schematism of the pure Intellect.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE LXIII.

As all varieties which by means of this Schematism arrive at our consciousness in general, must either be given and affect our receptivity, or be such as at least can be given; the schemata of the Intellect confine the use of the Categories either to objects in time and space, that is, to experience, or to objects of possible experience.

## PRINCIPLE LXIV.

Nature materially considered, is a collection of Phenomena as they are represented by intuitions. Nature, according to its form, is the connection of those Phenomena determined by general laws.

## PRINCIPLE LXV.

As there is nothing connected in our Intuitions, Conceptions, and Knowledge of Nature, which has not been connected by the mind; it follows, that the synthetical acts of the Intellect contain the sole origin of all that connection we find in Nature.

PRINCIPLE LXVI.

The Categories are the most general forms of the conceptions of Nature, the schemata the most general conceptions of natural objects, and the judgments into which the schemata may be resolved, contain the most general laws of Nature.\*

PRINCIPLE LXVII.

The laws of Nature as derived from the schemata of the pure intellect, may be arranged under the following titles :

- I.  
Axioms  
of  
Intuition.

\* The reader will observe, that these paradoxical and seemingly unintelligible Principles are altogether founded upon the following reasonings: We know not the things themselves; we know only how our senses are affected by them. To analyse our ideas of things, and to conclude, that what we have discovered in our ideas must therefore be in the things, is a conclusion perfectly erroneous. For it has more in the concluding part than lies in the premises.

2. Anti-



2.  
Anticipation  
of  
Apprehension.

3.  
Analogy  
of  
Experience.

4.  
Postulates  
of  
Experimental Reasoning.

PRINCIPLE LXVIII.

The Principle of all Axioms of Intuition is:  
That all Intuitions of which we shall become  
conscious, must involve a variety capable of being  
united in our consciousness; that is, must be ex-  
tended quantities determinable by number.

PRINCIPLE LXIX.

The Principle of all Anticipation of Apprehen-  
sion is:

That the Reality in an intuition or phenomenon  
which refers to sensation, must have a degree in  
time, that is, it must arise in time or fill up a space.

of time, otherwise it is nothing to us, it cannot be comprehended in our consciousness.

### PRINCIPLE LXX.

Of the Analogies of Experience the Principle is;  
That without the idea of a necessary connection between our apprehensions of experimental objects, no experience would be possible.

### ANALOGY THE FIRST.

In all the changes which the Phenomena undergo, the substance remains unaltered, and its Quantum in nature is neither encreased nor diminished; *i. e.* every phenomenon must be represented as containing something which remains and something which changes, that is, every phenomenon must be considered as a substance which has accidents, or it is not representable at all.\*

\* These Principles are known, but they are always derived from experience: although they have their seat in the mind alone, and tend to make experience possible.

ANALOGY THE SECOND.

All events in time must admit of being connected according to the laws of cause and effect, or we can have no experience of them.

ANALOGY THE THIRD.

All substances which have co-existence in space, are in continual action and re-action, or whatever phenomena may exist in space, they stand in mutual connection.

PRINCIPLE LXXI.

4.

The Postulates  
of  
Empirical Reasoning.

FIRST, What agrees with the formal conditions of experience, is possible, or what in any object is conceivable and intuitive, *i. e.* knowable, is possible, *may* exist.

SECONDLY, What is coherent with the material conditions of experience which are sensations, really exists; or what has become really known, that is,  
what

what has moved our senses, excited intuitions and conceptions, really exists.

THIRDLY, What stands in connection with real existencies and has this connection warranted by the general conditions of experience, exists necessarily ; or, whatever, according to the invariable laws of knowableness, is connected with what is really known, exists necessarily.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXII.

The world with its objects and laws may be viewed by our senses alone, and then it is a world of phenomena, or it may be contemplated by the pure intellect alone, and then it is a world of Noumena or an intellectual world, or a world of substances, which three expressions mean the same thing.

#### PRINCIPLE LXIII.

The conception we have of the world of Noumena, contains no knowledge of that world, but is a mere conception of demarkation. It distinctly separates that field of objects which may be known from that which can never be known. It is therefore

fore of great importance, and teaches man where his *ignorance begins*.

PRINCIPLE LXXIV.

As all that knowledge which we can acquire by the intellect and our senses is strictly confined to the world of phenomena, it remains to be enquired what may be known by Reason.

PRINCIPLE LXXV.

REASON.

Reason is a faculty of the mind which may be called the third and highest degree of mental Spontaneity. Its action consists like that of the intellect, in connecting a variety.

PRINCIPLE LXXVI.

As intuitions are connected by the intellect into conceptions, and, as besides conceptions, there is nothing in the mind for reason to connect, it follows, that reason must connect our conceptions only.

PRIN.

PRINCIPLE LXXVII.

As our conceptions are either pure or empirical, the ideas which reason will produce by connecting them, must accordingly be either pure or empirical.

PRINCIPLE LXXVIII.

To ascertain the exact number of the primary ideas which reason is able to produce, we must endeavour to put ourselves in possession of the exact number of the different connecting acts which this faculty is capable of exerting.

PRINCIPLE LXXIX.

The different connecting acts of reason can be discovered by forming an accurate conception of their general nature.

PRINCIPLE LXXX.

As reason connects by conclusions, the general nature of conclusions will contain the general nature of the connecting acts of reason.

PRIN-



## PRINCIPLE LXXXI.

The general nature of a conclusion is,

FIRST, That it consists of three judgments; but as every judgment comprehends a represented variety in a conception, a conclusion will consist of three comprehending acts, or conceptions.

SECONDLY, That it comprehends an intuition in a conception, and a conception under a higher conception, and thus arranges what is particular under what is general. For instance; All men are mortal; the great Locke was a man; therefore the great Locke was mortal. The most general and most extensive conception, in this instance, is that of mortality; this conception contains in its sphere besides many other things, all beings called men; and this last conception of all men contains the intuition of Locke, so that in this conclusion, Locke is arranged under man, and man under the conception of mortality, and, therefore, that which is particular under that which is general. This may be illustrated by the following figures:

Q

THIRD,



THIRDLY, That the highest conception under which others are arranged be universal, that is, include totality of species and individuals; otherwise no conclusion is possible: For instance; Some men are learned; Philippus is a man, therefore Philippus is learned. This does not follow, because the highest conception, in this instance, which is that of being learned, includes only some men, and therefore comprehends not totality of individuals. Reason, therefore, cannot conclude without universal conceptions.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXXII.

If the general nature of all conclusions consists in arranging an individual idea under a specific, and a specific under a generic, we know enough to discover all the primary connecting acts of reason.

PRIN.

## PRINCIPLE LXXXIII.

Reason, thus, arranges ideas of things and their properties one under another, and this concluding act, by which it so arranges ideas, is categorical; or it arranges the ideas of causes and effects one under another, and this concluding act will be hypothetical; or it arranges wholes and parts one under another, and this will be a disjunctive concluding act; but besides things and properties, causes and effects, parts and wholes, there are no other things in the universe the ideas of which reason could arrange one under another, therefore, there are no more species of concluding acts of reason than the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive.

## PRINCIPLE LXXXIV.

As the third or last judgment in every conclusion is the most essential of all the rest, and on that account gives the whole conclusion its name, there will of course be as many different appellations of conclusions, as there are various species of judgments; but all these under-species of conclusions must either be categorical or hypothetical, or

disjunctive, and thus stand under these kinds of conclusions already explained, or they have no contents at all, and are perfectly senseless.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXXV.

To get at the primary ideas of reason, after the exact number of its acts have been ascertained, we must reflect that reason chains together conceptions, and that the most remarkable and essential parts of conceptions are their respective forms.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXXVI.

If reason connects conceptions, of course, it must connect their forms, and as their most general forms are the Categories, reason will connect the Categories.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXXVII.

As the result of every connection is unity, the results arising from the connection of the Categories by reason will be unities. These unities, whatever they be, agree in the circumstance of being produced by reason from the Categories, and,  
therefore,

therefore, have a common nature which may be denominated unity of reason in general.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXXVIII.

The characteristic of this general unity, is, that it is unconditioned, which term implies, that it is exempt from those conditions that circumscribe a thing in time and space.

#### PRINCIPLE LXXXIX.

The Categories which are connected into this general unity of reason, form a variety that is unconditioned; for they are merely the different modes of being connected of what may occur in time and space; they are grounded in the intellect, and cannot fill up any time or space; they are, therefore, free from the conditions of time and space, that is to say, they are unconditioned. No wonder then, that the unity in which this unconditioned variety is connected by reason, is also an unconditioned unity.

PRIN.

## PRINCIPLE XC.

The unconditioned unity, though the most abstract idea that can be formed, must necessarily be thought by every man who would make any use of his reason.

Having thus described the general nature of the unities produced by reason from the Categories, we may now exhibit the specific difference that distinguishes them from one another, in the following order :

## PRINCIPLE XCI.

Reason connects the Categories of Quantity, which are Unity, Multitude, and Totality, so as to produce an idea, which involves unconditioned Totality. The totalities in time and space are circumscribed by limits that are time and space also; these limits have again limits of the same nature, so that we may go on *ad infinitum*, and never arrive at an absolute totality in time and space. Reason alone, by connecting a variety, that is not in time and space, is enabled to produce the idea of an absolute totality, which, though it contains no knowledge



ledge of things, yet serves to render a conclusion possible, to regulate our knowledge, and to induce us to push it as far as we are able.

### PRINCIPLE XCII.

Reason, by connecting the Categories of Quality, which are Reality, Negation, and Limitation, produces the idea of an unconditioned Limitation. Every reality in time is limited by negations. It is a variety, whose parts can be measured by degrees only; but the degrees in such a variety have degrees that are *smaller*; these degrees have others *still smaller*; so that we may, in our thoughts, divide the degrees as far as we please, and we shall find no end to the division. Every degree, therefore, in a reality in time is conditioned; it depends upon another degree, and so on. Reason requires absolute totality in this series of degrees, and, therefore, forms an idea of unconditioned limitation, or of a limitation no longer depending upon other limits.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE XCIII.

Reason, by connecting the Categories of Relation, produces the following ideas :

FIRST, That of an absolute Substance. The substances in time and space are merely collections of properties, which in a judgment are made the predicates of a subject ; but on analyzing the subject, we find that it likewise contains a mere collection of properties, which are found in another subject, and so we may proceed *ad infinitum*. But as properties cannot subsist by themselves, and must be grounded in something which has an existence of its own, Reason, which requires totality in a series of depending properties, forms the idea of an absolute substance, which cannot be any longer the mere predicate of another, but which contains the ultimate ground of the inhering predicates.

SECONDLY, The idea of an absolute Cause. In the world of phænomena, every cause depends upon a preceding cause. Reason, which looks for absolute totality in a series of conditions, finding no such totality in time and space, because, there  
is

is no end to preceding causes, forms the idea of an absolute cause.

THIRDLY, The idea of unconditioned Concurrence. If we think an assemblage of Substances in time and space mutually working upon each other, we shall find, that in each of the Substances there is a cause, which not only produces effects upon the others, but which is itself an effect. Now, as in all the substances which stand thus in connection, there are causes that have other causes, these causes again others, and so on *ad infinitum*, it is clear, that the series of causes which connect and determine such an assemblage of substances, has no end in time and space. Reason, which requires completeness or totality in a series of causes, and not finding it in the world of phenomena, forms an idea of unconditioned concurrence, that is, an idea which contains the complete and full cause of the various connections between the substances of the world. This idea of a completely determined concurrence is unconditioned, that is, it excludes the conditions of time, which are always conditioned, and contains only a concurrence where

R

the

the connection is determined by causes that are no longer effects of other causes in time.

#### PRINCIPLE XCIV.

Reason, by connecting the Categories of Modality, produces the idea of absolute Necessity. The Categories of Modality are Possibility, Existence, and Necessity. They mark only the various modes of conceiving, of which man is capable. Possibility expresses conceivableness and its laws; Existence signifies real conception and its laws; and Necessity implies real conception, determined by the invariable laws of the conceiving faculty. Absolute necessity is that whose contrary is impossible, that is, contradictory. There is no absolute necessity in time; for all that is in time is an event or a change. Every change in time is determined by a preceding change, and therefore is not absolutely necessary. Reason, which requires totality in this series of changes, and not finding it in time, forms an idea of something which does not depend on a preceding change, which is exempt from these conditions of time, and which is in all time, that is, which is absolutely necessary.

TABLE

## T A B L E

OF THE

### PRIMARY IDEAS OF REASON.

1. Unconditioned Totality.
2. Unconditioned Limitation.
3. Absolute Substance.
4. Absolute Cause.
5. Unconditioned or absolute Concurrence.
6. Absolute Necessity.

To shew how Reason, merely by connecting the Categories, acquires these remarkable ideas, would require more than an introductory view can reasonably comprehend.

### PRINCIPLE XCV.

These ideas of Reason are not derived from experience ; for experience can offer no shadow of object to which they can in any manner refer ; they are consequently ideas *à priori* ; the roots from which they shoot up lie in reason, and reason, which produces them, is pure reason.

## PRINCIPLE XCVI.

By these ideas, as they have been described, it is evident, that we cannot know any object. For what man will conclude, because his reason gives him ideas of absolute substances, causes, &c. that, therefore, he knows such things. To know a thing we must be able to instance a particular intuition of the thing. But where shall we get here an intuition. The surrounding world cannot even afford us a faint similitude of what is represented in those ideas, much less an exact copy. Reason has no intuitive faculty, it can only conceive the objects here alluded to; but to conceive and to know an object are totally different things. It is, therefore, clear, that by these ideas of reason we may conceive something, but we cannot know any thing.

## PRINCIPLE XCVII.

It does not follow, that because we cannot know any thing by these ideas, they therefore are of no use. He that thinks them in their purity, and knows that, according to their forms, they are unities or modes of connection by reason, and that  
the



the Categories constitute the materials so connected, must necessarily suspect some valuable end, for which they were given to man.

#### PRINCIPLE XCVIII.

These pure ideas refer by means of the Categories, which they connect to the Schemata of the pure intellect, and by means of the Schemata to our intuitions. Resolve these references of the pure ideas into the following Judgments, and the use of them will become clearly visible.

### J U D G M E N T S

ARISING FROM THE

#### PRIMARY IDEAS OF PURE REASON.

FIRST. The idea of absolute totality gives the following Judgment concerning its reference to intuitions.

All extended quantity of the phœnomena in nature is unconditioned, that is, whatever limits their extension may have received from the intellect, yet we must consider it by reason as determinable *ad infinitum*,

*infinitum*. Is it small? we must believe, that it might be still smaller *ad infinitum*. Is it great? we must believe, that it could be still greater. Experience, thus considered by reason, has no limits. In the world of phænomena there is nothing so small that it could not be diminished, and nothing so great which could be conceived as the greatest. *In mundo non datur hiatus*. It is this Judgment which induces the natural philosopher, after he has discovered some animals that are exceedingly small or great, to expect, somewhere in this or other globes, others still smaller or greater, and thus to continue his course of enquiries into the nature of phænomena *ad infinitum*, which none would attempt who had not this idea of reason in his thoughts.

SECONDLY, The idea of absolute or unconditioned Limitation gives the following Judgment :

All intensive quantities of the phænomena, when viewed by Reason, are to be considered as unconditioned.

Intensive Quantity is in the events that are in time and not in space; which have no breadth nor height, but which yet arise and vanish. These events

events are determined by the intellect, and their parts are fixed by certain limits. Reason does not stop at these limits; it says, that in the field of possible experience, or in time, there are no ultimate limits to any reality. If any passion rises in time to a certain degree measured and determined by the intellect, Reason holds out the idea of unconditioned limitation, and whispers to us, that the same passion may have more or less degrees *ad infinitum*, and that there is nothing of the world of phenomena existing in time, which is not capable of innumerable degrees, and among the various degrees, nothing which should not be a degree also. *In mundo non datur saltus*. The intensive *Quanta* are *quanta continua*, and there is in time neither absolute reality nor absolute negation.

THIRDLY, The idea of an absolute Substance gives the following Judgment :

All connection of properties with their substances in the world of phænomena, when viewed by Reason, must be considered as unconditioned.

The Substances viewed by the intellect have only a certain duration, a certain species of properties, and are phænomena, that is, intuitions, which  
arise

arise and vanish, and are limited on every side. Reason, by presenting the idea of an absolute substance applied to time and space, bids us not to consider the things with such contracted views, not to believe this or that object is either capable of no more or no other properties than we have observed. The connection between properties and things in this world has no limits; the number of properties has no bounds. We must not, therefore, stop in our enquiries into things. For we may make discoveries of new properties and things without end, and as every thing in the world of phænomena is merely a collection of properties, we must diligently collect and compare them, that we may discover what properties are most general or essential to the phænomena, and thus acquire accurate notions of the operations of the causes, or the substances in which they originate.

FOURTHLY, The idea of an absolute cause, when applied to time and space, contains the following Judgment :

All connection between causes and effects, as viewed by reason, is unconditioned.

The

The causes and effects known by experience, have a determinate connection, a determinate duration, and would confine the attention of man within the small circle of things and their consequences, which he knows. Reason comes and enlarges the views of the mind. It instructs the world, that beyond actual experience, there are more things to be known; that one cause may have more than one effect; that causality in things may be modified in a thousand different ways; that the effects must partake of this modification, and be diversified; that, as every cause arises in time, it must have a cause also; and that therefore we must not stop in the series of causes and effects already discovered, but pursue them to what produced them and follows from them, and so on, *ad infinitum*. For in the world of phenomena there is no first cause, nor any effect that could with reason be called the last.

FIFTHLY; The idea of absolute concurrence, in its reference to time and space, gives the following Judgment:

All concurrence of the phænomena, by action and re-action, must be considered as unconditioned.

S

All

All the phenomena in the world make a whole which is supported by mutual action and re-action; but considered by the understanding alone, this whole discovers a determinate co-existence, consequence, and duration; for the understanding reaches not farther than what it has actually comprehended.—Reason views this whole as infinitely determinable in its duration, co-existence, mutual actions, and as a boundless coherence in time, where there is nothing unconnected, and, consequently, nothing absolutely beginning. *In mundo non datur casus purus.*

SIXTHLY, The idea of absolute necessity as applied to time and space, involves the following Judgment:

The existence of the Phenomena in *all* time must be considered as unconditioned.

The existence of the Phenomena, as known by the understanding, is determined; they must arise in time, and have a cause; their existence is necessary as far as their cause is necessary; the necessity of their existence, therefore, depends on something different from themselves; it is conditioned, and therefore not absolutely necessary. Reason  
does



does not stop at this which may be known by mere experience also; it considers the existence of all events in the world as conditioned, and the being conditioned of all events as progressive *ad infinitum*. There is, therefore, according to reason, every possible event in the world of phenomena, determined on all sides agreeably to the laws of experience. *In mundo non datur fatum*, and as reason requires completeness in those conditions, which render the existence of the Phenomena possible, it requires something which is absolutely necessary, and which must be in all time.

#### PRINCIPLE XCIX.

These judgments into which the ideas of reason have been resolved are principles of reason; they are not derived from experience, and, therefore, have the character of Necessity and Universality.

#### PRINCIPLE C.

These principles of reason, although we cannot by means of them acquire any knowledge of objects, yet they are indispensably necessary to bring the knowledge we have acquired into systematical

order, and to regulate those plans according to which we may most advantageously enquire into the nature of the surrounding world.

### PRINCIPLE CI.

As reason neither by its ideas nor by its principles can know any thing ; it follows that this faculty can give us no knowledge of immaterial existencies ; for, by itself, it cannot give information of any existing object. All the ideas which it produces, although they imply something which is not found in time and space, namely, unconditioned totality ; yet they contain no knowledge of objects distinct from the mind, and serve only to regulate our experience, and to promote our progress in experimental knowledge. As reason, the intellect and the sensitive faculty are confined to experience, it follows, that all men can know, are the objects in time and space, and those conditions in the mind which render such knowledge possible.

SOME

SOME REMARKS  
ON  
PROFESSOR KANT'S  
PRINCIPLES  
OF  
*THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.*

---

THE Principles of Professor Kant, which I have just laid before the reader, are fully demonstrated in the Criticism of Pure Reason. They do not, however, make one half of those important Principles which that work attempts to establish, and which, in the opinion of the acutest German Philosophers and Mathematicians, it has actually established with extraordinary success. I have selected the above principles, because they will enable me clearly to shew what influence the Kantian Philosophy will have on some of those sciences which have a direct reference to the most sacred

sacred interests of mankind, and which are the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Morals, and Religion considered within the bounds of Reason. The rest of Kant's Theoretical Principles, contained in the above work, are equally important in another respect, because they precisely determine the number and extent of those of our fundamental doctrines of mechanical and experimental science, which have their origin in the mind alone, but which are still generally and very erroneously derived from experience. But these principles, for the sake of brevity, I have thought proper to omit in this introduction.

## ANSWER

To some of the Objections which may naturally arise from the defenceless state in which the above Principles of Kant are placed.

The above extract will perhaps be charged with great obscurity. I confess it is obscure; but the ground of this lies in the want of demonstration. To understand clearly the meaning of hidden truths, it is not sufficient for us to have them stated, we must also distinctly see the arguments upon which they

they are founded. But the arguments upon which Kant's Principles, above adduced, are founded cannot have a place in a mere introduction ; it is, therefore, no wonder that some obscurity does hang over them in this extract, although I have endeavoured to be very explicit. However, the obscurity is not so great as to preclude all light. I am confident, that some rays of truth will occasionally strike the reader, and convince him that Kant's Philosophy deserves, at least, to be studied and examined ; which is what this Treatise principally aims at. I have strictly adhered to Kant's language, in order to reconcile the reader gradually to the sound of some of the terms which he uses, and which may appear somewhat unfashionable. But this circumstance will perhaps occasion considerable censure. I must, therefore, remark, that as Kant has drawn to light whole species of new phenomena in the mind, he had only two ways to express them, either that of inventing words, or that of using our store of philosophic terms as well as he could. He chose the latter, and borrowed his language from Aristotle and Plato, wherever necessity required it,

and

and this particularly, because those great men had fallen upon similar ideas, and invented terms to convey them, not unknown to the scholar. Some of our modern philosophers have indeed discarded those terms of Aristotle and Plato as scholastic trash. But had they perceived to what discoveries the imperfect ideas that were in the terms of these great men would lead if properly investigated, they would not have done so. In short, the few unfashionable words which Kant is obliged to use for conveying his thoughts precisely and clearly, are the most proper which he could find, and, I confess, I know of no better. However, if any of the learned can propose an improvement in this respect, let him not conceal it; for to improve the language of philosophers, is certainly doing great service to philosophy. The most essential objection that will be made to the above extract is, that Kant's System leads into Scepticism, because it maintains that the figures in which we see the external objects cloathed, are not inherent in those objects, but only in our ideas of these objects, and that consequently space is something within, and not without, the mind. Scepticism is imputable

to



to that system only, which aims directly or indirectly at the foundation of our real and substantial knowledge. Whatever other meanings the term Scepticism may have, it is chiefly in this, that it can throw censure on the Kantian doctrine regarding space. Without proving the truth of this doctrine, I shall endeavour to show that it has no tendency to encourage Scepticism, as described : for, first, suppose the figures of external things lie only in our ideas of them, does it then follow that our knowledge of external things is, therefore, uncertain and doubtful ? Will not the same external existencies produce the same impressions on our organs, and will not the same impressions on our organs occasion the same figured ideas of them, especially as the synthetical functions of our spontaneity, like those of every other power, are bound down to certain laws, and must accordingly, on the same occasions, operate in the same manner ? And so long as the same external things excite the same ideas in our minds, what else do we want to guide us through life ? Can we say, that, in such an order of things, we could not know what would hurt our well being, or promote our happiness ?

T

Can

Can we alledge that our knowledge of the external world would become less charming and sublime? Can there be any thing more sublime than to know that we live in a world whose various objects are presented to the mind under an immense variety of regular pictures and proportions, and of which we are yet allowed to know nothing more than that it exists, and that we exist in it? Is there in this awful obscurity, which every where surrounds us, nothing sublime? and is it not worth while to gather the strictest information of all the impressions which it is making upon our senses? Besides, have not philosophers already universally granted that colour and solidity are, properly speaking, not in the things, but in our senses, and that only the causes of colour and solidity, which are always different from their effects, lie in the things said to be solid and coloured? To say, that if there be no space without, it is absurd to travel or measure distances, may be pleasant ridicule upon this doctrine, but as an argument it is exceedingly susceptible of the same ridicule, and, in fact, it is no argument at all; for ridicule proves nothing. The mystery which surrounds the possibility

lity of measuring distances by our own passes, or other instruments, lies within and not without the mind. Supposing space to be external; and this supposition will not at all clear up that mystery; for to measure distances requires a measuring faculty, which is no other than the spontaneity; and what is more, the idea of space must be called to our assistance, and be in the mind, in order to afford the synthetical act of this faculty some substratum upon which it may exercise its measuring-functions. Here, then, it may be explained how man can travel, or, what is more, how, in travelling, he can measure distance. The labouring feet know nothing of distance, nor are the eyes fitted for such knowledge; for even to see, there is required not an eye only, but a faculty of forming ideas. How, therefore, can the spontaneity measure distance? It is, indeed, extraordinary, that the mind should be so formed as not only to represent the changes affected in our organs, by external powers, in various pictures, without the aid of external space, but also to place these pictures at a distance from one another. But yet this is really the case. The distance that lies between

a rainbow in the sky, and the spectator on the earth may, like that of every other visible phenomenon, be precisely measured; and yet every body knows, that the rainbow exists no where else but in the eye of the spectator. How, then, comes the mind to place the idea of a rainbow, which forms originally only a set of sensations in the eyes, at a mile's distance from the idea it has acquired of the place of the body? Both these ideas are evidently in the mind, and to measure their distance, external space is of no use; for to this there is requisite a space in the mind. How can the spontaneity by means of these three ideas measure the distance of the two former? To say, it can do this because there is an external space, is absolutely explaining nothing. It is, therefore, pretty clear, that the supposition of an external space cannot afford a solid foundation for ridiculing Kant's doctrine as rendering the travelling or measuring of distances impracticable; for that supposition does not in the least explain how the mind can have an idea of travelling or distance at all, much less how it can conceive a line between things that are more than a full mile apart, and  
exist

exist no where else but in the mind. Besides, from Kant's doctrine of space, it follows, though it had been denied by other Philosophers, that our intuitions must be distant from each other, because the form of each intuition is space ; two intuitions, therefore, must be in two places. It may be further objected, that if there be no external space, there is also no external world. But this is concluding by far too much from these premises. If there be no external space, it will follow that we are not authorised to assign extension to external things, but there will follow no more. Any one acquainted with what space is, and knowing that it originates in the structure of the Receptivity and the synthetical act of the spontaneity of the mind, will unavoidably be confirmed in the conclusion, that there must exist an external world. For the receptivity is a mere passive faculty, (See Principle ix.) It cannot, as such, produce the materials of which our sensible ideas consist ; nor can the spontaneity do this ; for its action is not the producing something from nothing, it is merely connecting. (See Principle x.) Hence, by mere spontaneity and receptivity alone we could not arrive at any  
 ideas

ideas at all; for even the materials of which imaginary ideas are composed, cannot be produced by either of those faculties, and must therefore be given \*. But whence could they be given if there was nothing existing without us? So far, then, is this doctrine of Kant from leading to the conclusion, that no external world exists, that it affords the strongest reasons to conclude the very reverse. It has been likewise remarked, that Kant's system, on account of his doctrines concerning space, is very similar to that of Berkeley; but nothing can be more different than the systems of these two great men. Berkeley, indeed, placed space, together with the properties it contains, in the mind, and so far he agrees with Kant; but not knowing what to make of space in the mind, he fell into Idealism, and has constructed a system of Philosophy directly opposite to that of Kant. It may be further objected, that Kant's Principles in general, as I have described them, seem to convert the whole procedure of the mind, in perceiving, conceiving, judg-

\* Professor Kant proves, that the existence of the external world is sufficiently secured by immediate consciousness.—How?—this will be shown at another time; for it lies not within my plan to prove any thing, but only to explain and to obviate hasty objections.



ing, and reasoning, into a sort of machinery, where perceptions, conceptions, &c. are fabricated in a manner somewhat too mechanical; but it ought to be remembered that the most respectable body of Philosophers have at all times, and with a remarkable unison, allowed the mind to connect thoughts, conceptions, judgments, &c. and that Kant has made but one step farther in the same beaten road, and demonstrated, that the mind not only connects thoughts, conceptions, &c. but also the materials of which our ideas are composed. Besides, Professor Kant would not even be understood to have discovered how the mind by its synthetic acts can arrive at any real perception and conception of things; for this would be impossible; he has only proved, that by means of them the mind really does arrive at its perceptions and conceptions, &c. The conditions under which the mind perceives can be known, nay, ought to be known, and make a machinery which we must call Philosophy of the Human Mind; but how we can perceive at all by means of those conditions, makes a question which none will propose who understands its meaning.

Without

Without demonstrating the truth of any of the Kantean Principles, (for this I shall attempt in another Work), I have endeavoured, in the preceding lines, to offer some reasons which might induce the reader not to judge too hastily regarding Kant's merits, and shall now proceed to state what influence his system may have on the improvement of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

INFLUENCE

INFLUENCE  
OF  
*KANT's PRINCIPLES*  
ON THE  
IMPROVEMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF THE  
HUMAN MIND.

---

THE Materialists, as has been mentioned page 43, convert the mind into matter, and make Reason, Understanding, and Sense, to be properties of organization, because according to their fundamental doctrine, all that exists is matter—the mind exists, therefore it is matter.

The Spiritualists having discovered immaterial objects convert the mind into a spirit, and so on.

The Idealists change the frame of the mind by depriving it of a faculty to know the external world.

U

The

The Sceptics want proof that our ideas agree with the things represented by them, and on this account do not firmly believe that the mind has faculties to know any thing with certainty.

From the Principles of Professor Kant laid down in the above extract, it follows :

I. That the Materialists are right, when they maintain that we know only material objects\*, but wrong, when they assert that mind is also matter ; for we are totally ignorant even as to what matter is, and by ascribing to it extension as an essential property, make that a qualification of an external thing, which in fact is only a qualification of sensible ideas. (See Principle XXIII.)

II. That the Spiritualists are perfectly right, when they insist that there is a great difference between mind and matter ; for matter is an object of external sense, and therefore extended ; but mind is not an object of external sense, and, therefore, cannot be extended† ; but they are completely

\* The term object means here all that is different from the mind and its operations, and exists external to the mind.

† The reader will remember that extension supposes space, and that space is not a qualification of things, but the mere form of our external intuitions.

mistaken in converting the mind on this account, into a simple spirit ; for the objective unity under which the mind views itself, is the most general form of all our conceptions originating in the synthesis of our spontaneity. But it is a mere form of thought, and no knowledge of a spirit. If it shall have any meaning, a variety must be comprehended under it, or it must be applied to time and space. And thus the doctrine of a spirit takes its rise from mistaking the simple form of our conceptions for the essential property of a thing. Of spirits we know as little as of matter. They may exist, but how they are qualified we know not ; for we know not the things themselves, but only how we are affected by them. See the Extract of Principles.

III. That the Idealists are perfectly right when they suppose that the substances, or that which is lasting and unchangeable are known by the intellect alone, and not by the sensitive faculty ; but completely wrong, when they convert our mere ideas of substances into really existing things, and on this account deny the existence of the changeable external world. For a substance is a mere

category applied to time, or a schema of the pure intellect. See Principle LVI. No. 3.

IV. That the Sceptics are perfectly right when they consider truth as lying in the agreement of our ideas with their objects, but thoroughly mistaken, when they imagine that the agreement between our ideas and their objects must lie in similitude, for ideas are not pictures of things; they can therefore display no degree of resemblance. See the Principles.

The first Influence therefore which Kant's Principles are very likely to exercise on our Philosophic Systems regarding the human mind is, that they will most effectually remove the faults which lie concealed in their very foundation; for these systems are altogether built, as I have just shown, on the supposed knowledge of material and immaterial objects, and the resemblance between our ideas and the things: the consequence of which has been, that the mind became transformed either into matter or a simple spirit; but, according to Kant, we know nothing of the things themselves; we have, therefore, no shadow of reason, to say that



that the thing called mind is extended and matter, or simple and a spirit.

The second Influence will be, that as the foundation gains strength by this reform in our views of things, so the superstructure, the Philosophy of the Human Mind, will profit by being rescued from the sophistical inferences that have been made from false premises. For let any man convert mind into matter or spirit, and he will in the first case be obliged, in order to remain consistent with himself, either to place our sensitive faculty in the organization, to give it irritability and to make reason and the intellect mere properties and powers of the nervous system, or, in the last, to separate the sensitive faculty from the mind, as not becoming an immortal spirit and attribute to it, only reason and understanding to enable it to contemplate things far superior to what are merely terrestrial; but in a Philosophic System of the mind, we have principally to enquire into its perceptive and reasoning faculties, and, according to Kant, we have nothing more to investigate. In an enquiry of this nature therefore, it is totally improper to consult the essence of things; for of the  
essence

essence of things we can know nothing. It is therefore as false to place the sensitive faculty in the organization, or in matter, and to make reason and the intellect power properties of the nervous system, as it is erroneous to exclude the sensitive faculty from the simple soul, and attribute to it only reason and the intellect. For it is totally unjustifiable to clothe the substance of the nerves, brain, or spirits, of which we know nothing, with extension or simplicity, and to distribute among these *bastard notions*, after having arbitrarily called them into external existence, the various faculties of the mind. According to Kant, the sensitive faculty belongs immediately to the faculty of perceiving, and not to the organization, or to a simple soul. The perceptive faculty of every finite being must have sense, that is, it must be passive with regard to the objects perceived; for these objects it cannot produce from nothing, otherwise it would be an Almighty Being and not a mere perceptive faculty. The manifest advantage, therefore, accruing from Kant's Principles to the Philosophy of the Human Mind, is, that they ascertain the extent and limits of this important science.

Accord-

According to them, we exclude from the field of this science, the external things, together with their essences, whether material or immaterial, and substitute in their room our ideas, conceptions, perceptions, notions, judgments, and reasonings concerning those external things, together with the various faculties of the mind considered separately, and consciousness which makes us acquainted with the existence and perceivable nature of these mental phenomena.

I am not ignorant that philosophers have endeavoured to proceed upon a similar plan, but it is easy to demonstrate that they still continue to mix in their expositions of the faculties of the mind, the idea either of matter or a simple spirit, which unfortunate circumstance must necessarily give to their most ingenious labours a very sophistical appearance, and prevent them from becoming universally evident.

The third beneficial consequence of the Kantian Principles is, that after the field occupied by the phenomena of the mind is cleared of what does not belong to it, they will explain how to cultivate its various provinces to most advantage. It is not  
suffici-

sufficient to show in a Philosophy of the Human Mind, that perceptions are connected with sensations, that we can remember things by the laws of mechanism or association, that our thoughts co-exist or are successive, that our understanding judges or connects a predicate with a subject, that reason concludes, and that imagination is the origin of poetry ; nor is it sufficient to show how these faculties may be most properly educated ; nay, even to go so far as to demonstrate to the world, that our ideas of time and space are merely relative, though this is indeed important, because it may lead us to ascertain the objects of the Philosophy of the Human Mind ; yet, if no more is done, there is, in fact, very little done, and we may, notwithstanding, remain for a considerable time at the mere portals of this science. For not to mention that it is impossible to form a correct plan for educating the mental faculties unless these faculties are properly understood, of what avail can it be to explain, how ideas are remembered, how they follow one another, to what faculty they belong, with what sensations they are accompanied, and what kind of vibrations must concur to produce them,

them, when the grand question is: In what do those ideas consist which are remembered, accompanied by sensations, and produced by vibrations? A Philosophy of the Human Mind ought to answer this question first, before it should think of attributing ideas to any faculty in the world, or attempt to account for their origin. But this is the very question that has not yet been able to obtain that attention which it deserves.

The Materialists give one answer, the Spiritualists another; and as these answers are found to militate against each other; they are considered by some persons as unanswerable, and by others as deserving no answer at all, because the subject of it is best known by consciousness and immediate feeling. If it be best known by immediate feeling, then it cannot be so well, or, indeed, not at all known by reasoning; and, in that case, all philosophising on this subject is at an end. But the fact is otherwise. Our immediate feelings are themselves objects of ideas, and no object of any idea, unless it be itself an idea, can afford the least information of what an idea is; nor does consciousness, when represented in an idea tell us, wherein an idea consists,

although it is by the operations of consciousness, that we know we have ideas, and may arrive at the knowledge of their comprehensible nature. It is, therefore, in vain to pass the question over, upon the supposition that its subject is known by immediate feeling, and without making a proper enquiry. But it is alledged that this question is unanswerable; because the whole matter lies beyond human comprehension. Professor Kant observes, that there is no phrase in language more liable to be misapplied than this. For to make a proper use of it, it is necessary, that we accurately know the limits of Human Knowledge; but what Philosopher is there who has described the limits of Human Knowledge, without having been opposed by descriptions of a very contrary nature. If, therefore, it is not yet decided what man can know, it is as little settled what might lie beyond human comprehension.

Professor Kant maintains, that although the essence of the things around us will for ever remain incomprehensible, yet what our ideas and thoughts consist in, can not only be comprehended but can also be known. For we do not ask here how thoughts and ideas are possible, but only wherein thoughts and ideas consist, that is, what their com-



component parts are, especially when considered in general. It is only by ascertaining the component parts of ideas and thought in general, that we can ever hope to discern that which in our ideas or thoughts of things belongs to the mind from that part of them which belongs to the things, and thus in the end be enabled to guard ourselves against confounding thoughts with things, and things with thoughts, which remarkable confusion is the only cause why the Philosophy of the Human Mind, as well as all the other branches of speculative science, have met with very little encouragement, though they treat of objects, which in point of importance, exceed all that we know. For let any man confound, for instance, in Metaphysics, the mere forms of thought with forms of things, as Aristotle unfortunately did, and the consequence will be, that although this confusion could not be laid open by Metaphysicians of less distinction than Aristotle was, yet it will, sooner or later, lead to contradictions that must finally bring the whole science, where they reside, into profound contempt, just as it has happened with Metaphysics in our days. But it may be asked, How can

we resolve our ideas into parts, since these airy beings appear to have no parts at all? and how, therefore, can we expect distinctly to separate in them what belongs to the mind from that which belongs to the things?—It is erroneous to say our ideas have no parts. For they must all of them have contents, or else they are empty, and this is already one of the parts of which they consist. Again the contents which they include, must be arranged according to some relations or other, or else our ideas would represent a disjointed parcel of materials, and not exhibit any entire object, as they really do; and this is already another part which must necessarily occur in every idea that shall deserve the name of an idea. These two points Philosophers will grant. But, according to Kant, we must not stop here. We must ask, What are the general features of the contents of our ideas? Kant answers, The contents of our ideas, whatever they may represent must be a variety. (See Principle VIII.) Even the objective unity and the unities produced by reason, cannot singly occur in our ideas, provided they are represented as the unities, or as the being connected of any variety.

variety. But in our ideas there is not only a variety, there is also a connection of the parts of this variety. This connection must not be passed over. For it contains the key to all Philosophy of the Human Mind. It originates in the comprehending and conceiving acts of the spontaneity, and not in the external things as was hitherto supposed. All the mental faculties exert connecting actions, they connect varieties into ideas, judgments, and reasonings. But these varieties must be given and cannot be produced from nothing. Who can doubt, but that by such a train of reasoning we must in the end arrive at that share which the mind has, and that which the things have in producing knowledge, ideas, conceptions, &c. Only we must not persuade ourselves that we have discovered a consistent and complete system of the faculties of the human mind, if we cannot demonstrate the precise number of the primary connecting acts belonging to the understanding, to reason, and the spontaneity of the first degree, which I have called apprehension, if we have not ascertained the exact number of the primary conceptions of reason and understanding, which I have called pure ideas  
and

and categories, if we cannot explain what is the general form of human conception, or of what is conceivable, and what the general form of human knowledge, or of what is knowable, or if we are doubtful wherein the receptivity of the mind consists, and know not what to make of time and space. A correct and accurate explanation of any of these points will easily lead to the discovery of all the rest ; but if any of these points be not accurately explained, it unavoidably follows, that all the rest are not properly understood. For the phenomena in the mind are so closely connected, that we either must be able to describe them all together, or we can describe none of them rightly. A remarkable instance of this truth is, that many of the Philosophers have fallen upon the opinion, that space is a mere relative notion, or, that it exists nowhere else than in the mind. But as they did not know how to account for the origin of this notion, and that it has its seat both in the natural conformation of our receptivity and in the synthetical acts of the spontaneity, they have filled whole volumes with remarks on the mind, which are often instructive and sometimes very amusing, but which

never-

nevertheless, give but ambiguous and superficial information concerning what man should understand by the terms Reason, Understanding, and Sense; which terms express the most essential subjects on which those remarks are made.

I have now stated what limits Kant prescribes to the philosophy of the Human Mind, what objects he excludes from the consideration of this science; and of what objects, according to him, it should properly treat, what method he recommends, in order to begin an enquiry into the mind, and what results he expects and requires from such an investigation, when accurately instituted.

Some of my readers will perhaps remark, that it is easier to form plans than execute them. But, nevertheless, it is true, that even to contrive such a plan, as Kant has proceeded upon, requires more than ordinary ingenuity.

But if any of my readers should doubt the truth of the Principles of Kant, which I have exhibited in the Extract, I must beg leave to observe, that I shall very soon submit them to the judgment of the public, in a work to be entitled, "*An Analysis of Perceptive and Reasoning Faculties of the Human Mind,*

*Mind, according to Kant's Principles*, where I shall endeavour to arrange them in an order somewhat different from that in which they stand in these pages, and furnish each of them with its proper arguments. These principles, as already mentioned, are contained in the *Criticism of Pure Reason*. But as this work pursues the synthetical method of arguing, which is indeed best adapted to the end it endeavours to attain; and as this method is attended with some degree of unavoidable obscurity, I have resolved to treat of the above principles, without which Kant will never be understood, according to the analytical method, which seems to admit of more clearness, and, on that account, better calculated to remove those difficulties which every man must meet with, who attempts to read Kant's Works, without being acquainted with the spirit and fundamental principles of his Philosophy, or without being a Philosopher of a very penetrating genius.

INFLU-



INFLUENCE  
OF  
*KANT'S PRINCIPLES*  
ON THE  
SCIENCE OF MORALS.

---

THE foundation upon which all moral Science must stand or fall, is the freedom of Human Volition. For if man has no choice in what he does, all the laws and precepts held out to direct and amend his conduct are perfectly useless.

The principal points to be considered in every science of Morals, are therefore these :

Has Man a free will?—and

Wherein does a free will consist?

The first question is commonly answered in the following manner: That man has a free will every body may know from his own feelings. But a Philosopher must not acquiesce in mere feelings; he

Y

must

must examine, whether the notions he receives from his feelings do not involve contradictions. If they do, they destroy themselves, and discredit that source from which they sprung.

Wherein consist our notions of a free will?

FIRST, The *Sceptics* abstain from all explanation, and say we have indeed a notion of a free will, but who can tell, that it refers to an object different from itself, or that it is not altogether fictitious.

SECONDLY, The *Fatalist* goes farther than the Sceptic, and considers the notion of liberty as contradictory.

THIRDLY, The *Materialist*, who subjects all action and passion of the mind to the laws of motion, affirms our conception of liberty to be without meaning, because all is nature, and proceeds according to the laws of nature.

Those Philosophers, who undertake to demonstrate the freedom of the will, divide into the following parties :

1. The Determinists maintain, that freedom of the will consists in its dependance on the laws prescribed by reason. But it is objected, since reason is a mere faculty of concluding, and depends for  
its

its operations on things external to it, reason is not free itself, much less can it make our will free.

2. The *Equilibrists* attempt to prove, that freedom of the will consists in its independence, both of the laws of reason and sense, and that it lies in a certain middle point, equally remote from the influence of the things around us, and that of our mental faculties.

3. The Theists consider the free will as a faculty to choose the best ;—and

4. The *Philosophizing Supernaturalists* look upon natural freedom to be a faculty to choose the worst, if a supernatural light does not interpose to direct its choice.

These parties accuse one another of absurdity and contradiction in principle ; but as they seem to feel, that it is much easier to refute opposite opinions, than to substitute any better in their room, they have agreed not to engage any longer in fruitless controversies, but to let every body indulge his own opinions in security. Even the names of Determinists and Equilibrists have disappeared, and are not much known. Nay, that man, who

searches the grounds, of these dissensions, is received but with a cold indifference, as warming up old and antiquated debates.

The *Moral Philosopher*, however, if he is an impartial man, and strives at universal evidence, cannot be indifferent towards the labours of his predecessors. He must carefully inspect them, in order to improve his own ideas, or to correct theirs, and if he finds that the age, in which he lives, has discarded the names of the old moral sects, but at the same time retained secretly their opinions and arguments, he is compelled, in order to avoid tedious circumlocutions, to class his cotemporaries under the old appellations of *Supernaturalists*, *Equilibrists*, &c. &c. or, what is worse, to invent a new language, to express the orders to which they belong.

Professor Kant is decidedly of opinion, that, although many strong and ingenious arguments have been brought forward in favour of the freedom of the will, they are yet very far from being decisive; for they have not refuted the arguments urged by the *Necessitarians*, of which the most impregnable seems to be the following :

All

All human actions are events in time. Every event in time arises, and has not existed from eternity. Whatever arises must have a cause. But a cause in time is an event also; it must likewise have arisen, otherwise its effect would have existed from eternity; therefore a cause in time must have a cause itself, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Hence it follows, that as every human action is an event in time, every human action must have a cause, that cause must have another cause, and so on, *ad infinitum*. But, on so long a series of causes and effects, human will can make no impression; it is totally impotent as to this; it is, therefore, not free.

To refute this argument, an appeal to mere feeling is of no avail; nor will the most ingenious contrivances be able to overturn it, until Kant's principles are called to our assistance.

Professor Kant treats this subject in the following manner: first, He shews that the notion of a free will involves no contradiction, and that it, therefore, is strictly conformable to all the logical rules concerning the essential qualities of a sound and  
good

good notion ; secondly, He endeavours to prove, that the above notion is not only allowable, but is grounded in facts, that cannot be denied. This last point I shall farther explain, under the head of Moral Laws ; and the first I shall prove immediately :

The notion of a free will is not contradictory ; for although it is beyond all doubt, that every human action, as an event in time, must have a cause, that cause another cause, and so on, *ad infinitum* ; yet it is certain, that the laws of cause and effect can have a place there only where time is, for the effect must be consequent upon the cause. But time, as well as space, are not properties of things ; they are only the general forms under which man is allowed to view himself and the world (see Principles XII to XXVI). It follows, therefore, that man is not in time and space, although the forms of his intuitive ideas are time and space. If man exist not in time and space, he is not influenced by the laws of time and space, among which those of cause and effect hold a distinguished rank ; it is, therefore, no contradiction

to



to conceive, that, in such an order of things, man may be free.

Some of my readers will wonder, that man should not be in time and space. He certainly is as long as we view him, through that medium, by which we are allowed, and necessarily must view every thing that falls under our attention. But that medium is inherent in the perceiving faculty, and not in the things. It inheres in man, as far as he has a perceiving faculty, and not as far as he is a substance. Now, as time and space constitute that medium, as I shall clearly prove in the work I have announced; take away that medium, and, though time and space are no more, man and the world will still remain.

Custom and habit will probably oppose these notions of time and space. But, first, Whoever places the things themselves in time, forms a notion of the world, which, like that of a square circle, involves contradictory parts, and may be resolved into two contradictory positions, which admit of equal force of argument in the strictest sense of the word. For, according to such a notion of things, it can be clearly and fairly  
proved,

proved, that the world must, at the same time, have a beginning, and not have a beginning. Secondly, Whoever places the things themselves in space, without being aware of it, authorises the following contradictions, namely, that the things in space are divisible *ad infinitum*, and not divisible *ad infinitum*, which two positions can likewise be proved with equal strength of argument. Thirdly, Whoever ascribes the laws of cause and effect, which connect the phenomena or intuitions in time to the things themselves, has a contradictory notion of the world, and may be refuted in a clear and unequivocal manner, by being apprized that, from his notion of things, it unavoidably follows, that there is an absolutely necessary being belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cause, and that there is no absolutely necessary being existing, either within or without the world. These contradictions, in which reason entangles itself, are as natural and unavoidable as the delusions of the eye, with regard to the colour of bodies, and the motion of the Sun. They have, for many centuries, exercised secretly, and without being detected, a fatal influence on moral philosophy, and our views  
of

of the surrounding things, and can be removed only by Kant's notions of time and space. Thus much to obviate hasty objections.

I shall now proceed to give a sketch of Kant's notions regarding the science of Morals itself.

### M O R A L S.

THE Science of Morals must, if it shall deserve the name of a Science, constitute a consistent whole of evident principles, teaching us, not how we are used to conduct ourselves, but how we ought to act at all times, and under all the circumstances of life.

As all Principles, forming parts of a Science, must have a common nature, which entitles them to a place in one and the same science, so the Moral Principles must have a common nature, which makes them belong to the Science of Morals.

The common nature of Moral Principles, taken together and comprehended in one position, will contain the most essential characteristics of all moral precepts, and must properly take its place at the head of them all, and, on that account, be called a first Principle of Morals.

Z

To

To know in what state the Science of Morals is at present, we need only compare the first principles recommended as guides to our conduct.

In order to enable the reader to form some previous judgment of Kant's System of Morals, it will, therefore, be sufficient to explain wherein his first Moral Principle consists, and to compare it with those proposed by other Philosophers.

The train of Reasoning, which leads to the first Moral Principle of Kant is the following:\*

Man has a power, by means of which he forms ideas of things. In this power we distinguish two points; first, a certain constitution, which enables it to produce a certain kind of effects, namely, ideas; and this constitution is the faculty of this power; secondly, a certain ground that enables it to realize those effects, which it is formed or modified by this faculty to produce, and this ground of energy is properly called power, or, in the present case, a power of forming ideas,

\* The reader will please to observe, that it lies far beyond the limits of this Treatise to enter into a minute detail of argument; for this would require a separate volume on Morals. Kant himself has found it necessary to write a separate book on the first principle of Morals, under the title of "Metaphysics of Morals," which alone consists of 128 pages.

The striving of this power to produce ideas, may be called simply the striving after ideas. This striving is primary and original. As all ideas consist of two parts (see Principle VIII), namely, Variety and Connection, the striving after ideas will either be a striving after variety, or after connection, or what is the same, after the matter or the form of an idea.

The striving after variety may be considered as the striving after something which must be given, and which cannot be produced by the mind. It may be farther called the striving after the being affected of our Receptivity; for no variety can be given, unless our Receptivity, which makes an essential part in the conformation or faculty of the power of forming ideas, is affected. The striving after the being affected of our Receptivity may be called interested in the widest sense of the word, because it cannot be satisfied, without something is given, in order to affect our Receptivity.

The striving after connection, or the form of our ideas, is intellectual, while that after the matter, or the variety of our ideas, is sensual. The former

is satisfied by action, and may so far be called disinterested, in the widest acceptation of the term.

Man has a faculty of being determined to action, not only by the things existing around him, but also by mere ideas of things in general. This faculty, when determined to action by the natural striving after variety and unity, which lies in the power of producing ideas, may be called the faculty of desiring.

Mere ideas, although their objects be absent, when they are referred by consciousness to our subject, either leave us in a state of indifference, or in some sort of pleasure or pain. Mere ideas, therefore, can produce, in our subject, a variety of pleasing or disagreeable sensations.

The faculty of desiring, when determined by the striving after a variety in our ideas, which excites pleasing or disagreeable sensations, is sensual, and, as all sensations are empirical, it may, on that account, be called empirical.

Sensations may be either excited by ideas immediately representing external objects, that is, by external intuitions, or by ideas immediately representing internal objects, that is, internal intuitions.

they



they may, therefore, in the first case, be called external sensations, and, in the latter, internal sensations.

The faculty of desiring, when determined to action by external sensations, is grossly sensual; but, when determined by internal sensations, it is a refined sensual faculty of desiring.

It has been observed, in the Abstract of Kant's Theoretical Principles, page 85, Principle XXXI, that our intuitive ideas, or intuitions of external and internal objects, are connected, by the intellect, into another species of ideas, called Conceptions. It has been further stated, Principle XLVI, that all human conceptions are ultimately combined with the twelve primary forms of all conceptions, which have been called Categories, and which are the original offspring of the pure Intellect. Hence it follows, that the intuitions of external and internal objects, as they are modified anew by the intellect, will produce some modifications in the sensations which they excite, and in the faculty of desiring, which I have mentioned to be determined by sensations.

When

When the faculty of desiring is determined by sensations excited by intuitions that are modified by the Categories of quantity, it strives after what is perfect in the sensible. For if any variety presented to our senses shall be pronounced perfect by our sensitive desires, it must form unity, multitude and totality ; or, what is the same, it must be determined by the Categories of Quantity. (See Principle xlv.)

The faculty of desiring, when determined by sensations excited by intuitions that are modified by the Categories of Quality, strives after something that fills up a time, and is calculated to affect the receptivity in an easy or a strong manner, so as to produce in it agreeable sensations or pleasure. The reader will recollect, that the Categories of Quality are Reality, Negation and Limitation, and that it is by them that the variety of time is consolidated into a whole limited by negation, which, as it contains more or fewer degrees, may naturally excite stronger or weaker sensations of pleasure. (See Principle xlv.)

Philosophers have hitherto considered all this under a different point of view ; they thought the deter-

determinate realities in time were determined by their *internal nature*. But Kant says, we know nothing of the *internal nature of the things themselves*, and the being determined of the realities in time, that is, of our internal intuitions, originates in the connecting intellect, and not at all in the things; which can only give materials for determination, but not the determination itself.

There is another remark which I must offer before I proceed, and which is, that the sensations modified by the Categories of Quantity, are susceptible of greater dignity than those of Quality, because they may be awakened by the mere idea of form, proportion, and regularity, which the imagination, agreeably to the Categories of Unity, Multitude, and Totality, delineates in mere space. The sensations modified by the Categories of Quality, require something more than mere form; they must have something given which fills up time and space; they are excited more by the gold or the materials of a statue, than by the art of the Statuary. The desiring faculty, influenced by the former of the sensations, inclines to disinterestedness, and, when properly cultivated, may pave the way

way to virtue ; but, when influenced by the latter, it may lead to interestedness and vice.

The faculty of desiring, when determined by sensations that are modified by the Categories of Relation, strives. (Principle xlv.)

(1.) After the continuance of agreeable feelings, and of that existence which is susceptible of so much pleasure. We desire this, when an intuition presents itself to our view which is determined by the Category of substance, where we contemplate something that lasts and braves the vicissitude of its properties. It is from this desire we derive the natural anxiety for the preservation of life.

(2.) After interested activity. This may be thus illustrated: All events in the world work upon our feelings, and either excite pleasure or pain. All events in the world have their causes. Now, two intuitions, of which the one exhibits an agreeable event, and the other its cause, and which, therefore, are determined by the Category of cause and effect,

fect, induce our desiring faculty, in a natural manner, to procure or realise such causes as produce events pleasing to our feelings. But to be thus active in favour of our feelings is to act interestedly.

- (3.) After interested company or society. A number of intuitions representing a number of men sitting one near another, and mutually producing in each other agreeable sensations, by action and re-action, naturally make us desire to be of their party ; but this is a desire after interested company occasioned by intuitions that are modified and determined by the Category of mutual concurrence. This is the source of the desire of propagation.

There now remain the Categories of Modality to be considered. But as these Categories, as I have observed in the Extract of Kant's Principles, see page 107, do not add any determination or modification to the objects of our ideas, it is evident that on this account they cannot, in any manner, modify or determine our desires after sensible va-

A a

rieties.

rities. They serve, however, to represent the desiring faculty under three different points of view, and to direct our enquiries into its nature. The Categories of Modality are Possibility, Existence, Necessity. When we view the faculty of desiring under the Category of Possibility, we consider its form, that structure and constitution, which renders it possible that it can desire at all, or find any thing desirable. When we view it under the Category of Existence, we consider it in a state of actual desire, and when we contemplate it through the Category of Necessity, we consider it not only in a state of actual desire, but also as determined in its desires by the unalterable laws of its constitution, or, what is the same, as desiring necessarily or instinctively.

The reader will perceive here the use of the Categories and their schemata. Without having discovered the exact number and the true nature of these remarkable notions, not only the division of human desires must be deficient, but also the nature and real objects of each of our desires must necessarily be misrepresented; however, this may  
be



be disguised by the splendid language of popular Philosophy.

We have completely considered those objects of our desires which are modified by the intellect, it remains now to examine whether or not reason has any share in determining our faculty of desiring.

Reason, as I have already shewn, likewise modifies our intuitions of external or internal objects. It, namely, connects the Categories into ideas; (see Principle lxxxvi.) and as the Categories modify our intuitions, it follows, that Reason must do the same.

What kind of modification is it that the intuitions or the objects of our desires receive from Reason?

Those of our intuitions representing a totality in time, which is always conditioned, or, limited by the intellect, are freed by reason from these limits, and extended into boundlessness; those exhibiting a reality in time, limited by negations, are represented as admitting of infinite degrees; those exhibiting a substance in time, which is ever circumscribed in duration and properties, are repre-

sented, as having infinite duration, &c. those exhibiting a cause in time, which is determined by a preceding cause, are represented as determined by an infinite train of preceding and surrounding causes; those exhibiting a whole of things in time, mutually working upon each other, which is limited by the understanding on every side, are represented by reason as a whole, whose parts are innumerable, whose connections are infinitely multiplied, and whose co-existence and co-herece is boundless. (See Principle c, to ci.)

Reason, therefore, by excluding all limits from the objects represented in our intuitions, renders our desires, which are determined by them, boundless.

All the objects modified by reason and the intellect taken together, form a whole, which may be denominated the grand object of human happiness, provided those objects recommend themselves by exciting pleasing sensations.

The desire of happiness, or, of being affected in an agreeable manner by objects, determined by reason and the intellect, is sensual, because it depends on sensations; it is rationally sensual, because reason

son modifies its objects ; it is natural to every man, because no man can be indifferent to the sensations impressed upon him by his ideas of the surrounding world ; but it is interested, because it can be satisfied only by something which is given ; it is not free, because it depends upon things that do not stand at the command of man ; and it is boundless, because it aims at an absolute totality of agreeable feelings, which all the treasures of this globe, and all the arts and contrivances of men cannot procure.

That science which points out those objects that affect man in a pleasing manner, and suggests the best means of procuring them, is the doctrine of happiness, and that system of rules which teaches how we should use our reason in order to make ourselves happy, is the doctrine of prudence.

Neither the doctrines of prudence nor of happiness can contain any general laws to guide the behaviour of reasonable beings ; for they are built upon experience ; and experience, as it extends only to a small number of cases, can never be the source of general laws ; they cannot impose any obligation upon any individual member of society ;  
for

for it is absurd to command how a man shall be happy, since every man has a peculiar manner of being affected, and a different idea of happiness. They are the genuine abettors of sordid and refined interest ; and as all manner of sensual interest corrupts the purity of moral sentiment, the changeable doctrines of prudence and happiness ought not to be confounded with the unalterable laws of Morality.

Man is a compound of reason and sense, and he is conscious that his faculty of desiring is either determined by reason or sense. When our desires are determined by sense, they depend on feelings, when by reason, they depend on ideas of general laws.

Theoretical Reason strives after unity, or the connection of our knowledge, by classing all our ideas under a few heads which it suggests, and which are absolute substance, absolute cause, &c. Practical Reason strives after unity or consistency among our various desires and their objects, by holding forth to our view principles and ideas which it likewise produces.

Reason,

Reason, therefore, as far as it has a power to determine our faculty of desiring is, on that account, practical, because it does thereby influence our practice. The faculty of being determined to action by reason is Will. Practical Reason, therefore, is the same with Will.

Our will is pure when it is determined by necessary and universal rules or laws ; it is not pure when it is directed by feelings.

*Remark.* It has been thought, that our actions acquire a very great value from their being determined, or directed by ideas of objects, or ends determined by reason and the intellect. But it ought to be remembered, that whenever ideas of objects recommend themselves to our desires by any sort of feelings, although they are formed or modified by reason or the intellect, yet our desires, when influenced by them, are sensual, and not, on that account, moral. But of this more afterwards.

In our faculty of desiring, we distinguish two things, which are matter and form. The matter is the object desired, or, an idea of what is agreeable or disagreeable ; for, whenever an object, distinct from the mind, shall be desired, it must  
excite

excite pleasing sensations. The form is the mode of desiring, and may either be rational or sensual.

Rational desires are determined by ideas of rules. A rule is a position which teaches how any variety may be connected into a regular whole. A rule is theoretical, when it teaches how to connect a variety of knowledge; it is practical, when it regulates the variety of our desires. A rule adapted to the will of a few individuals is a maxim; but when it is conformable to the reason of all rational beings, it is a law. Practical rules reduced to laws are practical principles.

All practical principles either originate in the matter of our desires, that is, in the objects which affect us; or they derive from the form of our will and practical reason, that is, from the mode in which reason operates, and the ideas it produces, independent of sensible impulse. The first may be denominated material, and the latter formal principles.

The mode in which reason operates, is known in the following ideas which it produces, by connecting the Categories. (See Principle xci, to ci.)

I. In



I. In the idea of absolute totality ; which, in a theoretical point of view, requires totality of knowledge; and in a practical, totality of cases, to which a practical principle must be applicable ; that is to say, the principles of our conduct must have the character of universality, or agree with the general will of all reasonable beings, and be applicable to all circumstances of life.

II. In the idea of unconditioned limitation which elevates our views above the limits of things in time, and manifestly teaches us to act independently of the quality of external objects, and the feelings which they produce. Reason acts uninfluenced by external objects, let us follow this mode of acting and be disinterested.

III. In the ideas of absolute substance, cause, and concurrence, which loudly exhort us to be unalterable in our conduct, to be self-active, and to harmonize in our actions with the actions of all rational beings.

According to reason, we must, therefore, act by principles that are universal and disinterested ; to these principles we must adhere unalterably—we must realise them by self-activity--not leave ourselves

to be roused by pain or pleasure, hope or fear, and thus endeavour to keep PACE with reasonable beings.\*

Reason either determines the will necessarily or not. In the first case the will is totally exempt from all sensible incentives, and therefore, holy; in the second, it is determinable by the sensual and is unholy. The human will is determinable both by reason and sense, but not necessarily by either.

A practical principle imposed upon a will not necessarily determinable by reason, is an imperative, which sort of principles announce themselves in our consciousness by the term "ought," or "should," and express that relation which subsists between the universal laws of conduct and the weakness of the human will.

An imperative which is founded upon something external to reason, for instance, upon an end to be obtained in the world, and which contains the means to that end, is merely hypothetical, and carries no obligation with it, unless it excites a desire of the

\* It might be objected that it is impossible for man to obey such laws, but this will be considered in the end of the section.

end proposed. An Imperative, on the other hand, which is founded upon reason itself, and which has no other end than that of realising the mode in which reason acts, is a Categorical Imperative which represents an action as necessary in itself, and imposes an obligation upon all those who would keep up their reason and not fall into contradiction with their own will.

Whatever determines our will is practically good, when it is grounded in laws that are obligatory to all reasonable beings; but when any thing determines our will which is founded upon the subjective qualification of the individual, it is merely agreeable, though it may not be bad—to be practically good, it must be founded upon the general reason of mankind.

The dependance of our desiring faculty upon feelings is inclination, and inclination supposes want. The dependance of this faculty upon reason, especially because it does not necessarily depend upon it, is interesting.

Every interest is either empirical or rational. Empirical interest is mixt with feelings, and either is pathological or logical. The pathological in-

terest aims at the agreeable and pleasing consequences of an action ; the logical aims at whatever might increase and improve our knowledge.

Interest purely rational is totally independent of whatever lies external to reason. Of this kind is the interest purely Moral, or Practical Interest, which we take in an action on account of its reasonableness, and not on account of that object or those ends and consequences in which that action is concerned. That constitution of human nature which renders it possible that man can take an interest in laws that are strictly disinterested and often inimical to the demands of sensual desires, is the source of moral feeling.

All interest is practical, that is, incites man to action. It is a fact, that every rational man takes an interest in the moral decisions of reason, it is, therefore, a fact that reason is practical, that is, may determine man to action. The most abandoned wretch, in the calm of serious reflection, when he has set before his eyes the example of a conduct, which is approved of by the universal voice of human reason, although he feels himself very much humbled by it, yet he cannot help wishing that his

own

own conduct had been such as to deserve the same universal approbation.

As it is a fact, that reason is practical, it follows, that the human will is free.

*Remark.*—I beg the reader to remember, that I adduced page 173, the argument of the Necessitarians against the freedom of the human will. I observed, that this argument is impregnable, as long as we transfer the laws of cause and effect, which reside in the phenomena of time or space, or what is the same, in our own intuitions, to the things themselves, with which we are not acquainted. This observation very plainly shows, that the Necessitarians confound in their argument the laws by which our intuitions are arranged, with the laws by which the things themselves are arranged, of which we know nothing, and affords all the reasons necessary to prove that our notion of a free will is not contradictory nor imaginary; for if merely the form of our intuitions of things is time, it does not follow that the active substance called man, must therefore have the same form and be in time also; and as man is not in time, his will cannot be influenced by the laws of time, which are  
those

those of cause and effect; for these laws can be only where time is. By this reasoning it has indeed been proved that the freedom of the human will may reasonably and without contradiction be conceived. But the question was, whether this reasonable conception be also real, and whether there be any fact in man by which its reality can be proved. This fact I have promised to point out under the head of Morals, and shall do it immediately. Nor need I observe, that the matter to be proved is of great importance, for upon the proof of it all Morals must either stand or fall.—The argument is as follows :—

The Human Will is determined by PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES OF REASON, therefore it is FREE.

I shall first explain what is meant by Practical Principles of Reason.

I. A PRACTICAL PRINCIPLE of Reason necessarily excludes from its contents all objects of human volition that are distinct from reason. For if it recommends to the will any object external to the mind, it derives from the knowledge of an external object, that is, from experience. Any practical principle deriving from experience extends  
only



only so far as experience reaches, and is, therefore, not strictly universal ; nor is it strictly necessary, because our experience may indeed show us that something is so or so, but never that it must be so. But it is a fact well established by consciousness, that a Practical Principle is strictly necessary and universal. For instance, “ *Be virtuous at all times, and under all circumstances of life ;*” and let thy virtue ever be disinterested. Although the notions of virtue and disinterestedness may differ in different persons, yet it is undeniable that at least the universality and necessity of these laws is acknowledged. Hence it follows, that a Practical Principle cannot derive from any knowledge of external objects, or experience ; for else it could not be universal and necessary, which it manifestly is. Now in every Practical Principle we distinguish two things, matter and form. The matter is the object of the will ; the form is the mode in which we will, or its reasonableness, or, the mode how reason would connect the variety of human actions, which may be clearly seen in those ideas that reason produces by connecting the variety of the pure intellect or the categories, and in those Principles. (See Principles XC to CI.) which derive  
from

from the ideas produced by reason. Now as a Practical Principle excludes all matter, that is, all objects of the will, distinct from reason, which destroy universality and necessity, there remains for it nothing more than the form, or the mode in which reason acts when it forms such a principle. The contents of a Practical Principle, therefore, exhibit no object distinct from reason or its produce, but the form of reason itself.

II. It is a fact that a formal practical principle can be represented and formed by reason only; that it cannot be an object of sense, and that it, therefore, cannot reside among the sensible phenomena. Consequently the idea of a Practical Principle, considered as a ground which determines our will, must be different from those grounds which determine the events in the world of phenomena; for every ground of determination in the world of phenomena is a phenomenon itself; the cause of a phenomenon in the world must arise and be a phenomenon; the effect of a phenomenon must be a phenomenon also.\*

But

\* The reader will please to guard himself against confounding the phenomena of things with the things themselves, of which

But now the idea of a Practical Principle is not one of the phenomena in question, it therefore cannot be the effect of a phenomenon; for otherwise it would be a phenomenon, which it is not; the idea of a practical principle is an idea of reason. But no idea of reason is an intuition; it therefore, is not a phenomenon; for intuitions only are phenomena, and it is only the intuitions which have the forms of time and space, or are in time and space, and not the ideas of reason. Hence the idea of a Practical Principle stands uninfluenced by the world of phenomena; but our will is determined by this idea; hence our will is determined by something that lies beyond the reach of the causes and conditions of phenomena; it is, therefore independent of the natural law of the phenomena, which is that of cause and effect. But such independence is freedom; hence our will is

which we know nothing. A phenomenon is an intuition and nothing more. Our intuitions are in time, because the general form of all intuitions is time. Every intuition arises and vanishes; the intuition implying a cause arises and vanishes; the same is the case with the intuitions expressing effects. The ideas of reason are not intuitions; therefore they are not in time and not determined by the laws of time, and not phenomena. See Principle LXXXIX.

C c

free.

free. Every human will, therefore, as it is determined by Practical Principles, is free.

As the human will is free, the formal Practical Principles of Reason are the true laws of freedom, for it is by keeping to them only that man can elevate himself above the influence of the surrounding world, and follow the natural laws of his reason.

All formal Practical Principles of Reason are Moral Principles; for all Moral Principles must be practical, universal, and necessary, and if they are so, then they are nothing else than formal Practical Principles of Reason.

If a man would remain free, or become gradually more independent of external impulse, he must strictly keep to the moral law, and endeavour to grow in obedience towards it.

To obey any law supposes knowledge of it. How can man arrive at an accurate knowledge of the moral laws? It is answered, by paying due attention to the natural emotions of the heart and conscience; but the emotions of the heart and conscience change in proportion as knowledge increases; they are different in different persons, nor  
are

are they at all times the same in the same person. It is very well for a man to follow the influence of his heart and conscience, while he knows of no other guides; but it is not sufficient in a science of morals, to consult merely the heart and conscience; for neither the one nor the other can be the source of universal principles, since both stand in need of direction, and if they are not educated by principle, will often lead the wrong way.

Man arrives at the knowledge of the Moral Law, or the law of his natural freedom, by the consciousness of the operations of his reason, although he is often at a loss to express them by words, or does not clearly understand them. Let him only ask himself when conversing with his friends and the world, Is my mode of acting such as to be fit for an universal law of conduct among reasonable beings? and he will find himself at no loss for an answer. Suppose a man calumniates another, and considers this as excusable, if he asks himself: Can calumny become an universal law among reasonable beings? he will directly perceive, that such a law would destroy itself, if generally introduced; and that consequently, in practising it he stands in contradic-

tion with his own reason, and must condemn himself. The same is the case with lying and the breaking of promises. These practices may be defended by an appeal to unavoidable necessity, or to the general torrent of moral corruption, which carries every thing before it, but they cannot be excused. For, in all these cases, man becomes immediately conscious of the laws: Thou shalt not lie; Thou shalt not break thy promise. These laws he cannot help acknowledging, and whatever contradicts them, he finds he must disapprove. But these laws, which every man acknowledges, are purely formal; they exclude all objects of the will, and tell us, with a loud voice, that we ought to follow them whatever we may will, and that we shall not lie nor break a promise under any pretence whatever. Man, therefore, knows the formal practical principles by consciousness, although he cannot often explain what be the true source from which they flow, what be their exact number, and their precise specific difference. Who can, however, strictly execute such rigorous laws? It is true, that no mortal will ever be able to execute them completely, because they are ideal;



ideal ; but man stands in need of such practical ideals ; his virtue is progressive, and not having any standard of moral perfection, or any ideals of moral laws before his view, how could he know what progress in virtue he has made, or how could he make any progress at all ?

It is, therefore, the first duty which a moral philosopher owes to mankind, that he represent the moral laws in all their rigour and purity. If he accommodate them to the weakness of human nature, he mistakes their end, perverts that standard by which men should measure the worth of their actions, and by misleading them, commits a crime that can only be excused on the ground of guiltless ignorance.

To represent the moral laws in their purity, it is requisite to know first wherein their common nature consists. The common nature of moral laws, as mentioned already, consists,

1. In their being formal laws, that is, in their not regarding any external object desired, and in representing the general form of reason alone as the pattern for imitation in our actions.
2. In their being universal.
3. In their being necessary.

A moral

A moral principle, expressing the common nature of all moral principles, is a first moral principle. And to know in what state the science of morals is, we need only compare the first principles of morals, as recommended to us by philosophers. I have promised to make this comparison in these pages, in order to show the difference between Kant's system of morals, and those of other philosophers. This promise I shall endeavour to fulfil immediately, and, to be as complete as possible, I shall begin with the first Moral Principle of Socrates.

#### SOCRATES.

*Strive after the Contemplation of what is most beautiful.*

THE ideal of beauty is the offspring of sense, the intellect, and reason. As this ideal does not express the form of reason alone, the contemplation of it can constitute no pure moral principle.

#### PLATO.

*Indulge thyself in the Contemplation of Speculative Truths.*

As speculative truths refer to more objects than the form of reason, those laws which are built upon

upon them, will contain more than moral laws should, that is, they will not be genuine moral laws.

EPICURUS.

*Strive after a State totally free from Pain.*

IN order to get rid of pain, experience is requisite; but experience can never be the source of Moral Laws.

ARISTIPPUS.

*Strive after the greatest Sum of Physical Enjoyments.*

But this is striving after something which can be obtained by experience only. No object lying external to reason, can suggest any universal law.

ANTISTHENES.

*Endeavour to be as free and independent, and to approach to the simplicity of nature, as nearly as possible.*

Freedom and independance are the result of a morally good behaviour, and cannot, therefore, be the cause of it, or a moral law.

THE

## THE STOICS.

*Consider the Welfare of the Whole as thy own Welfare.*

To know the welfare of a whole of reasonable beings we must know the general nature of reason ; if we have acquired this knowledge, let us act accordingly, and not trouble ourselves about the welfare of the whole ; for this will follow of course, if every individual only endeavours to be reasonable.

## ARISTOTELES.

*Strive after the highest Improvement of thy Mental Faculties.*

This is a useful, but not a moral law. A moral law does not command us to attain a particular end, but it teaches us how we ought to conduct ourselves in general, whatever be the end we may propose to reach. Besides, any law recommending a particular end, is a particular law, and, therefore, wants an essential characteristic of a moral law, which is Universality.

POLE-

POLEMON.

*Strive after the greatest Sum of Corporeal as well as  
Mental Enjoyments.*

Any law recommending enjoyments derives from experience, and so far from being a moral law, it is no law at all.

HOBBS.

*Act agreeably to the Laws of thy Country.*

This is a particular law. It confines man to the laws of a country only. But no government can provide laws for every particular case. The moral law is universal, and not particular. It commands us to be reasonable and good, were we even among the Savages of North America, where there are no political laws.

MANDEVILLE.

*Act conformably to the Conventions of Men.*

This law is as particular as the former, and therefore not moral.

MONTAIGNE.

*Act so as to gain the Favour of those who are in Power.*

This law recommends a particular end, and is therefore, not universal ; it is not moral.

HUTCHESON.

*Follow the Dictates of Moral Sense.*

The dictates of whatever comes under the appellation of sense, can only be known by experience ; but no sort of experience can be the source of strictly universal and necessary laws. Besides, the feeling connected with the moral law, is consequent upon practising and contemplating that law, and not antecedent to it. A man who places before his view an example of strict and universal integrity or veracity, feels himself humbled by it ; for he is conscious that his conduct falls short of this perfection. But this humiliating and remarkable feeling, which may be called regard for the moral law, is not antecedent but consequent upon it. It is



is the effect of a law, and therefore cannot constitute the law itself, or be the source of the law.

### SMITH.

*Act so that the impartial Spectator can sympathise with the Motives as well as the Tendency of thy Actions.*

But this is appealing from the court of reason to another court, that must stand itself under the jurisdiction of reason. No man is strictly impartial; he can only approach to this ideal. Why, therefore, should we make the changeable, and often unjust, emotions of another man's sympathy, the standard of moral worth. Any principle, which holds out to our view the decisions or conduct of particular men, as a standard or pattern of imitation, is not universal, because it can only derive from experience; it is not necessary, because experience cannot teach necessity; it is not formal, because it blends and confounds the unalterable form of reason with the changeable decisions of man; it is, therefore, in no respect moral.

## WOLF.

*Strive after Perfection.*

If this Principle were intended to exhort us to realize the decisions of reason, or its invariable form, it would not employ the vague term of Perfection, which already holds out an object different from reason itself. Besides, to make one's self perfect, supposes obedience to the moral law, which must necessarily guide our endeavours, if we would approach to perfection in virtue.

## CRUSIUS.

*Strive after the Favour and Approbation of the Deity.*

No immoral being can obtain the favour of the Deity, if its immorality proceeds from inexcusable guilt. A moral law, therefore, has nothing else to teach us, than how we must act, in order to become morally good. If it holds out an object of terror or happiness, it bribes man into virtue, makes him an hypocrite, who pretends to love virtue, but in fact, loves only the profit he hopes to derive from it.

There

There are men who are so weak as not to have it in their power to conceive clearly the disinterestedness of the moral law, and, therefore, cannot resolve to shew it in their actions. Upon these men we must have compassion, and not ridicule their principles, while they are not yet susceptible of better instruction. We cannot all be equally wise, and he is the best, the worthy man, who endeavours to act according to his best knowledge, and to improve his knowledge. However, in a science of philosophic morals, we are bound to represent the laws of our natural freedom in their genuine purity, and rescue them from all mixture of fear and pleasure, which must necessarily impair that freedom, and spoil the purity of moral sentiment.

#### THE ECLECTICS.

*Encrease the Powers of the Mind and Body, bring them into the best possible Harmony, and let them all work towards one End.*

The whole of this principle depends upon the end towards which the powers of man shall direct their operations. If this end be any thing distinct  
from

from the form of reason which we are to realise according to the moral law, then the whole principle, although useful in other respects, is very different from a genuine moral principle; if, on the other hand, that end is not distinct from the form of reason, it ought necessarily to have been couched in other terms.

### KANT.

ACT ACCORDING TO THOSE PRINCIPLES ONLY  
OF WHICH THOU CANST WILL THAT THEY OUGHT  
TO BECOME THE GENERAL LAWS ON CONDUCT  
AMONG ALL REASONABLE BEINGS.

This Principle is first formal, for it recommends no other object than the mere form of reason; it is universal, because it extends to all reasonable beings; and it is necessary, because the contrary of it cannot be even conceived, without destroying all thought of a moral law. An universal law of conduct is necessary; for a number of free actions, not directed by universal laws, must, necessarily contradict each other, and throw the whole into confusion.

The reader will now find, that the difference between the first moral principle of KANT, and those  
of

of other philosophers, is, the former is built upon reason alone, the latter upon something which is different from reason; the first is formal, universal, and necessary; the latter are material, particular, and not strictly necessary; the first says, Let us, on all occasions, be morally good, whatever may be the consequence. The latter are not content with this; they propose some particular end, and force reason into the servitude of sense; for whatever object or end distinct from reason be recommended, it can only be known by experience, and only be desired as far as it excites pleasing sensations or makes us happy. In such a case we do not strive to realise the general laws of reason; but to acquire pleasing sensations, and reason must work as a servant to propose the best means of obtaining them; and, in being forced to do this, it is a slave, and not free; the consequence of which is, that we become slaves also, and make ourselves dependant upon things which change with the weather, and very often do not stand at our command.

It is perfectly right to strive after pleasing sensations or happiness; for the desire of happiness,

is

is essential to human nature, and can only be destroyed with the destruction of human nature. But man discovers another desire as essential to his nature as that of happiness. He wants not only to be happy, but to be also a morally good man, that is to say, to keep up the natural freedom and independence of his will. Every man has, therefore, two great ends, in which all his exertions and desires ultimately centre, and these are happiness and independence, or virtue. Both ends taken together, form the great and complete object of all human desires or the highest good, and every man must necessarily desire both virtue and happiness as long as he retains the nature of his mind and body. The highest good, therefore, consists not in mere virtue, as the Stoics believed, nor in mere happiness, as the Epicureans affirmed, but in the union of both. The highest good must be supposed by every man who will not fall into contradiction with himself, as practically possible, that is, as something which it is possible to realise. For if it be not practically possible, our desires of virtue and happiness are directed towards something which is impossible, or what is the same, they are altogether



ther absurd. And this, I hope, none will suppose. If, therefore, it be granted, that the highest good is practically possible, those conditions, under which alone it can be so, must likewise be granted. Now, it is clear, that when happiness is made the road to virtue, all virtue is destroyed, and disorder and confusion is the immediate consequence, which can neither be called happiness nor the highest good; whereas if virtue be made the road to happiness, happiness will not be destroyed, but only confined to general laws which preserve it against extravagance, and give it consistency. Hence it follows, that the highest good is practically possible, only upon the condition that **VIRTUE BE THE CAUSE OF HAPPINESS**, and that man, before he strives after any particular set of pleasing sensations, should always reflect, first, whether the moral law would permit him the enjoyment of them or not.

I might conclude here the moral part of my Treatise; for I believe I have already done what I have promised. I intended to give the reader a previous notion of Kant's Morals. This, I hope, I have, by explaining the common nature of his

Moral Principles, or his first Principles of Morals. Those arguments which lead to it I have enumerated, as far as the limits of this Treatise permitted me. I have only to mention, therefore, that the work wherein all this is treated more at large, is the Criticism of Practical Reason, which consists of about 292 pages, and which first proves that reason is practical, and that the will of man is free; secondly, that the complete number of moral laws may be, discovered, and how; thirdly, that it is the moral law alone which leads to a rational belief in a God, and the immortality of the soul; and, fourthly, that it is only a just enquiry into the bounds of human knowledge, which can secure these important notions, as well as the laws of morals against the comfortable attacks of Fatalism, Scepticism, and Empiricism. And this important enquiry, Kant, as mentioned already, has very successfully attempted in his Criticism of Pure Reason. I now proceed to state that influence, which his Principles may have on our belief of the immortality of the soul, and the existence of the Deity, which are the basis of all religion.

INFLU-

INFLUENCE  
OF  
*KANT'S PRINCIPLES*  
ON  
RELIGION.

---

Is the soul immortal? If not, religion has no end. Professor Kant proves the immortality of the soul in the following manner:

A will determinable by the moral law can have no other object than the highest good, and all its exertions must ultimately centre in happiness and virtue. As the highest good is not practically possible without virtue being made the cause of happiness, (see page 217.) it follows that only complete virtue can produce complete happiness, and thus render the highest good practically possible. Complete virtue, therefore, though not real, must yet be possible; for if it be not possible, the

E c 2

highest

highest good cannot be possible, which is absurd. The will of man is not completely conformable to the laws of virtue, for it is not holy, nor CAN it be completely virtuous, because virtue is an ideal which may be approached, but can never be reached by a finite being. But although the laws of morals cannot be completely fulfilled yet they must be acknowledged as necessary to be practised. Now, as we must follow the moral law, and can realise it only by approaches that are progressive *ad infinitum*, it is necessary for the sake of our own practice to suppose such a progress as practically possible. For if this progress is impossible, the moral law cannot be realised; if it cannot be realised, it is impossible; and to practise the moral law would, therefore, be to practise something which is impossible. In the physical world we discover the strictest fitness; in the moral world this fitness would be destroyed, if we conceive that there could be any law that cannot be fulfilled, even by approaches that are progressive. What reason have we to suppose the latter? It might be asked, What reason have *we* to suppose it? We suppose it to preserve the use of our reason, which would be directly

rectly destroyed, if we take away the fitness from the moral world.

The case, therefore, stands thus: Those who deny an infinite progress towards virtue, have no reason to do so, for they cannot defend themselves by experience, nor by grounds *à priori*. Those who hold the affirmative have sufficient reasons for doing so, because it is only by affirming this that we can reasonably resolve to practise the moral law, and preserve the use of our reason in a moral regard, which no man will relinquish upon slight grounds.

Now, as we are bound by reason to suppose our progress in virtue will be infinite, and as this progress cannot be made, unless the same person continues its existence, it follows that the highest good is practically possible only on the condition of man's immortality.

Immortality being inseparable from the highest good, and the only condition under which it is practically possible, it is, therefore, a postulate of practical reason, or a position which must be granted whenever we grant that the highest good is practically possible.

To

To know what kind of evidence this is, we must carefully examine what kind of evidences man has, and wherein their nature consists.

We examine human evidence, when we consider what it signifies: To be of opinion, to believe, to be certain, and to be demonstratively certain.

I. The expression. To be of opinion, means, to take something for true, but from reasons that are neither subjectively nor objectively sufficient. This will be best illustrated thus: Suppose a man in India acquaints his friend in London that he lies dangerously ill. The person in London, when receiving this intelligence, may think that his friend abroad has died before the intelligence arrived; and in thinking this he is merely of opinion, that is, he takes something for true, namely, the death of his friend, with the consciousness that he has neither sufficient subjective nor sufficient objective reasons for the conclusion; not sufficient subjective reasons, because the mere thinking a person dead, though it be not unreasonable in the present case, is yet no argument that the person is really dead; and not sufficient objective reasons,  
because



because the person supposed to be dead, is abroad and not under his inspection; he cannot, therefore, examine him on the spot to know whether he be dead or alive.

II. To believe, is to take something for true with the consciousness that there are sufficient subjective reasons for doing so, but no objective ones. For instance, we believe that Augustus was a Roman Emperor. To this we have no objective reasons, for the object of this belief, the Emperor is no more, and we cannot draw from him any reasons concerning his former existence. But we have sufficient subjective reason to take it for truth, that he really did exist; for all historians testify this, and the matter itself is neither unreasonable nor inconceivable.

III. To be certain, is to take something for true with the consciousness that both the subjective and objective reasons are sufficient. For instance, we are certain that such a country as England exists; for we are in it, and have it before our eyes, and there is nothing in our subject or our thoughts which does not corroborate this truth.

IV. To

IV. To have demonstrative certainty, is to have such a certainty as makes us conscious of the impossibility of the contrary. For instance, we are certain that every point in the circumference of a circle is at an equal distance from the centre ; for we have sufficient objective and subjective reasons to this truth. But we have in this instance not only certainty, but also demonstrative certainty ; because we are conscious of the impossibility of the contrary ; for if every point in the circumference of a circle were not at an equal distance from the centre, there would be no circle.

Is the proof brought forward by Kant in favour of the immortality of the soul, such as to afford demonstrative certainty ? No ; for it contains no objective reasons, immortality being no object of which we can have knowledge, for to have knowledge of an object, the object must be represented by an intuition, that is, it must be in time and space, and affect our senses ; but this cannot be the case with immortality. As the proof contains no objective reasons, and therefore no certainty, it contains much less demonstrative certainty. But ought we not then to believe it ? By all means ; for we  
have

have sufficient subjective reasons, although we have no objective ones. We must believe it, in order to be able to make any practical use of reason, which is by far more necessary and important than the theoretical.

The Kantean argument in favour of immortality, therefore, stands thus :

1. Immortality cannot be demonstrated, because it is no intuitive object.
2. The contrary of immortality cannot be demonstrated, because it would be demonstrating something of which man can have no intuition, that is, no knowledge\*.
3. In favour of immortality we have sufficient subjective reasons, but not a shadow of subjective reason against it.

In this situation of things we must believe in immortality, or else lay aside all use of reason at once. But although we must believe it, we cannot be certain of it, and this uncertainty is highly favourable to the cause of virtue ; for were man quite

\* In the Extract of Principles, I have shewn, that by our Reason, Intellect, and Sensitive Faculty, we can know only objects in time and space, among which immortality cannot be reckoned.

certain that he is immortal he could not be virtuous, because he would act from fear or hope, and thus degrade the purity of his moral motives, which consists in strict disinterestedness. I must repeat a remark which I have made above, that it is a great difference to write a scientific system of morals, and to improve the usual moral notions by sermons. The first requires all the rigour of cold and impartial truth, and the second a humane condescension to the habitual moral notions of our fellow creatures, whose situation in life does not always allow them to see truth as quickly as the philosopher does. The great rule, "Act strictly conformable to thy best knowledge, and endeavour to improve thy knowledge," must, in this particular, never be lost out of sight. It will preserve amity among people of different opinions, and not retard the progress of truth.

I shall now adduce Kant's argument in favour of the existence of the Deity.

The highest good, as already mentioned, is possible to be realised. It consists of virtue and happiness; and if it were not possible to be realised, it would be absurd either to strive after virtue

tue

tue or happiness; for, in such a case we should strive after something which is impossible.

As the chief part of the highest good, which is virtue, leads us into a belief of immortality, so the second part of the highest good, which is happiness, will lead us into a belief of the existence of the Deity.

To be happy, it is requisite that all proceed agreeably to our will and wishes; for we are unhappy in proportion as things take a turn contrary to our will and wishes. Happiness, therefore, is founded upon the agreement of the surrounding nature with our will and desires, with the end for which we exist, and with the essential grounds that determine our will. Let the determining grounds of our will be opposed by nature, and the discordance must either diminish or destroy our happiness. As the moral law, which determines our will, is different from the determining grounds of the phenomena in nature; one being a law of freedom, and the others mechanical causes, it follows, that the moral law cannot contain the least ground for supposing \* a necessary connection between

F f 2

virtue

\* The Moral Law has been mentioned before to be the cause of happiness, and now this seems to be contradicted. But the reader

virtue and a proportionate happiness in a being belonging to the phenomena of nature, as a part, and which yet is directed in its actions by a law directly opposite to the mechanical course of nature. Man thus situated, in order to enjoy happiness proportionate to his virtue, must either be the author of nature, or have the course of nature at his command; but being himself a part of nature, and, consequently influenced by its laws, he has no power to regulate its course so as to procure himself a proportionate happiness.

But although virtue be not attended with a proportionate happiness in this world, yet the possibility of realising the highest good, necessarily depends upon a proportionate happiness being the consequence of virtue. For every rational and finite being necessarily desires happiness, that is, an agreement of the surrounding nature with the unalterable laws of his desiring faculty. If it be impossible for nature ever to agree with our de-

reader will remember, that it has been added, we must *believe* that the Moral Law is the cause of happiness, because otherwise the highest good would not be practically possible, and not because the Moral Law contains any ground to suppose that it really is so in this world.

fires,



fires, happiness can never be realised ; if happiness can never be realised, the second part of the highest good, which is happiness, would be impossible. To strive after happiness, therefore, would be to strive after something which is impossible, that is, it would be absurd, and the highest good, in such a case, could only consist in being virtuous. But the complete highest good of a finite and rational being, can never consist only in being virtuous ; every being of this description has wants, desires, feelings, and necessarily must desire that the surrounding world should agree with his wants, desires, and feelings, and not oppose them. But the present world does not discover any exact agreement of this kind, nor has man the power to make it coincide with the necessary demands of his will.

If, therefore, virtue cannot procure a proportionate happiness, it is absurd to practise it. For the existence of a man practising virtue is not improved by virtue ; on the contrary, he is always exposed by it to the severest sacrifices, and that without attaining any regular end. If no man, in such a case, could reasonably propose to follow the laws

laws of virtue, and if a proportionate happiness be thus impossible to be produced by virtue, it follows, that the highest good is a mere chimera. Hence it is clear, that the highest good necessarily depends upon a proportionate happiness being the consequence of virtue, and must either stand or fall upon this foundation.

However, to keep up the use of our reason, and to preserve our natural freedom, we must necessarily strive after virtue, and as virtue, reason, and natural freedom were without an end, if they did not tend to improve our existence and to make us proportionately happy, it unavoidably follows, that in order to remain reasonable, we must necessarily suppose a proportionate happiness to be consequent upon virtue.

But he that allows this connection between the parts of the highest good, must necessarily allow that condition under which this connection is, possible. This condition of possibility can lie nowhere else than in a cause distinct from nature, in a cause which produced nature, and has the power to realise the agreement of nature with our moral conduct. Hence the highest good is possible

ſible only by ſuppoſing a cauſe different from nature, a firſt cauſe of all nature. But to proportion happineſs to virtue, requires a will and underſtanding. Hence the firſt cauſe, in order to realiſe the higheſt good, muſt have a will and underſtanding, *it muſt be a Deity*. And thus it follows, that the higheſt good is not poſſible to be realiſed, unleſs there exiſts a God.

There remains, conſequently, the following alternative only. Either we muſt allow, that the higheſt good can be realiſed, and then we muſt neceſſarily grant that condition under which alone it can be realiſed, that is, the exiſtence of a Deity. Or we muſt deny that the higheſt good can be realiſed, and then we muſt give up, if we can, all deſire of happineſs and virtue as chimerical, and conſider both as impoſſible to be realiſed; which, I conceive, no man will do, who would not have his name ſtruck out from the liſt of reaſonable beings.

What ſort of evidence is that, therefore, which Kant offers in favour of the exiſtence of the Deity? It is no demonſtration; it is not certainty; but it is belief, a belief founded upon the moral nature of  
man,

man, and as impossible to be shaken as it is impossible to deny the authority of the moral law.

The influence which Kant's Philosophy in general, and particularly his arguments concerning the Deity and the immortality of the soul, may have on religion, is that it secures these two important objects against all manner of demonstrations, which have done more mischief in the moral world than even Fatalism. There is no demonstration possible, either for or against the existence of any of these important objects. For we have no intuition of them, and if we have no intuition we can demonstrate nothing. Besides, if Kant's Principles are well understood, we shall not say, that we are as certain of the existence of the Deity and immortality, as we are of our own existence. We have no such certainty on this head; for of both objects we have no knowledge, but only notions; but from mere notions of things we can derive no certainty that the things really exist. Moreover, by thus destroying improper arguments, which never fail to produce Scepticism, room is made for a rational belief, which, although it be not the highest

highest degree of conviction, yet is perfectly sufficient to make us strive after virtue, and to leave us an opportunity of becoming virtuous from disinterested motives. For even to believe in a Deity supposes a regard for the moral law, and it is only he that will not relinquish that law, that can sincerely believe in a God. The physical world can of itself give no information of a God; it is a collection of causes and effects, where every cause has another cause in *infinitum*. And though we are led by it to a first cause, yet it is the moral nature of man alone, which teaches us that the first cause is a moral being, that is, a God.

As the existence of the Deity and the immortality of the soul form the grand source of all religion, and as I have already explained Kant's opinions upon these subjects, I hope, I have done as much as the end of this work required of me, and may now leave my reader to judge himself, whether Kant's Philosophy deserves to be studied and examined or not.

As this Treatise concentrates a number of Theoretical and Practical Principles, which are scat-

tered over the extent of five volumes, and as it places before the reader, the most important results of the Kantian Philosophy, together with the Principles from which they arise, I hope it will not be considered as a work of no use, however deficient it might be with regard to style and execution.



THE END.